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In the early stages of new product development, project selection is dominantly 
based on managerial intuition, rather than on analytic approaches. As much as 90% of all 
product ideas are rejected before they are formally assessed. However, to date, little is 
known about the product screening heuristics and screening criteria managers use: it has 
been suggested that their decision process resembles the “fast and frugal” heuristics 
identified in recent psychological research, but no empirical research exists. A major part 
of the product innovation pipeline is thus poorly understood. 
This research contributes to closing this gap. It uses cognitive task analysis for an 
in-depth analysis of the new product screening heuristics of twelve experienced decision 
makers in 66 decision cases. Based on the emerging data, an integrated model of their 
project screening heuristics is created. Results show that experts adapt their heuristics to 
the decision at hand. In doing so, they use a much smaller set of decision criteria than 
discussed in the product development literature. They also combine heuristics into 
decision approaches that are simple, but more complex than “fast and frugal” strategies. 
By opening the black box of project screening this research enables improved project 
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CHAPTER 1: PROBLEM, OBJECTIVES AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 Screening Methods in the Fuzzy Front End 
The early stages of new product development are frequently referred to as the 
fuzzy front end (FFE) [1] because they are poorly structured and documented. Front end 
activities are focused on information gathering, idea and concept development, planning, 
and evaluation [2]. They culminate in the decision to abandon a product idea or to accept 
it and to define a formal product development project and approve its budget, timeline, 
and work description [2]. The screening of innovation project proposals in the front end 
is considered one of the most challenging tasks for senior management [3]. Screening 
decisions are complex and made under high levels of uncertainty based on relatively 
limited information. At the same time, they affect a firm’s future in terms of profitability 
and survival and have consequences for the allocation of resources and the development 
of key competencies [4, 5]  
Front end screening is highly selective. There are always more ideas than can be 
thoroughly evaluated, let al. one funded [6]. It heavily relies on managerial judgment or 
heuristics: Griffin [7] shows that approximately 50% of all product ideas in the front end 
are abandoned even before analytical project selection methods, such as a business 
analysis, are being employed and that less than 40% of the initial ideas make it into 
product development. Stevens et al. [8] state that the ideas that make it into the 
organizational idea pool ,and are briefly- considered in the front end, are only the tip of 
the iceberg. According to Stevens et al. [8] estimates 90% of ‘raw’ ideas do not find a 
sponsor who is willing to take at least minimal action, such as performing simple 
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experiments or discussing the idea with management. Managerial heuristics furthermore 
play an important role in the so called initial reaction a quick, early screen of ideas that 
relies on the experience of managers who act as gatekeepers and determine which ideas 
should be considered in the front end evaluation system [9]. 
However, to date, little is known about how managers make early stage screening 
decisions. There is anecdotal evidence that screening decision are based on very simple 
and highly individual approaches that are sometimes verbalized as simple rules, such as 
"look for companies selling aspirins, rather than vitamins," or "find markets the size of 
Texas" [10] page 282 - on venture capital screening. Screening decisions are furthermore 
based on few criteria. One venture capital broker reports that he screens investment 
proposals based on only three questions: "Is it a big market? Can your product win over 
and defend a large share of that market? Can your team do the job" [10] p.228. 
Accordingly, Exxon Chemicals moves projects to the next decision gate if a team of 
screeners agrees (without extensive research) that it fits strategically, addresses an 
attractive market, is technically feasible, and does not suffer from any killer variables 
such as regulatory restrictions [6]. Research on gatekeeper behavior in the front end 
product development furthermore demonstrates that gatekeepers rely on experience to 
assess a small set of criteria before they take up new ideas, provide resources (such as 
access to networks of decision makers) and promote the idea so that it can be evaluated in 
the company's front end funnel [11, 12]. They are likely to accept a raw idea and promote 
it quickly if they recognize its value and feel that the costs and risks associated with the 
project are acceptable [12]. This gatekeeper behavior can result in an ‘initiation gap’ for 
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technology-driven, radical innovations, which fail to be evaluated, and consequently 
funded, because they are uncertain and do not easily fit the evaluation criteria and 
management approaches that management usually employs [13].  
Current research thus provides evidence that early stage project screening occurs 
through simple heuristics that focus on a few criteria that are evaluated with equal 
weights and in a non-compensatory fashion. However, the actual screening heuristics 
used are unknown.  
This dissertation opens the black box of managerial screening heuristics by 
investigating the screening behaviors of experienced gatekeepers through cognitive task 
analysis.  
1.2 Research Objectives 
The intent of this study is to advance existing knowledge toward a more complete 
understanding of expert judgment behavior related to screening projects at the FFE of 
NPD by investigating the decision heuristics that are currently used by managers for 
screening new product proposals at the fuzzy front end and to model them. Such a 
detailed description of heuristics will allow researchers to evaluate the quality, accuracy, 
and overall effectiveness of these heuristics, and create heuristics-based, simple decision 
models that fulfill management needs during the fuzzy front end of new product 
development.  
The objective of this research is summarized into two main goals: 
4 
 
G1. Discover decision makers' heuristics for FFE project screening 
G2: Structure the observed heuristics in systematic models 
This research is concerned with answering four research questions: 
RQ1: What are the main objectives and constrains for FFE project screening? 
(Context of heuristics) 
RQ2: What are the criteria used in the evaluation process? How are they ranked or 
weighted? How are they used to discern alternatives? (Structure of the heuristics) 
RQ3. Are similar heuristics used by different managers? (Patterns of use)  
RQ4. How can the identified heuristics be modeled? (Model heuristics) 
1.3 Research Approach 
Three major activities were undertaken: 1) extensive review of the literature on 
decision approaches and an evaluation of their applicability for project screening at the 
FFE, then review the literature on the theory and practice of heuristic, emphasizing on the 
“fast and frugal” decision making heuristics, 2) field study to elicit the heuristic decision 
processes used by expert project screeners, 3) modeling of the heuristic processes 
identified in the field study.  
The findings of the desk study will be covered in Chapter 2. Chapters 2.1 and 2.2 
identify the features and requirements of project screening in the FFE, describe 
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commonly used decision making tools for project selection, and assess their applicability 
for FFE screening. Chapter 2.3 introduces managerial heuristics as an alternative decision 
making approach and describes their theoretical bases.  
Chapter 3 identifies the gaps in current state of art in regard to FFE screening 
which this research is aiming to close, to answer four research questions. 
Chapter 4 introduces the research methodology for the field study by studying the 
theories and practices of knowledge engineering, which, as a field, captures expert 
knowledge for the design of knowledge-based systems [14]. Cognitive Task Analysis 
provides an important methodological framework and with a variety of approaches for 
expert identification, knowledge elicitation and capture, knowledge modeling and for 
ensuring reliability and validity of the research findings [15, 16].  
Chapter 5 is devoted to data collection and analysis. A total of twelve respondents 
were researched, leading to about 66 project screening decision cases. Data analysis was 
done in multiple phases of process analysis technique using QSR NVivo 9. The results of 
the data analysis process are discussed in Chapter 6 along with the steps taken to ensure 
the validity of the research results.  
The seventh and final chapter, Conclusions, reviews the findings of the study, 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive study of judgment 
behavior in the context of project screening in the fuzzy front end (FFE) of new product 
development (NPD). It reviews three major research streams: 
The first part (section 2.1) studies the literature on new product development, 
emphasizing on understanding the context, importance, characteristics and needs of early 
project screening at the FFE stages.  
The second part (section ‎2.2) reviews decision management methodologies and tools to 
support FFE project screening that were previously proposed in the literature, namely 
analogy-based models, economic models, multi-criteria decision models, decision trees, 
and heuristics decision models. Based on the review, screening heuristics are identified as 
a potentially useful approach to front end screening.  
The third part, (section ‎2.3), discusses the theoretical foundations of research on 
heuristics and presents the limited empirical findings on the subject that is currently 
available. Section 2.4 summarizes the gaps identified in the review of the state-of the art.  
2.1 New Product Development and the Fuzzy Front End 
The NPD process is highly selective; by some estimates, it takes as many as 3000 
raw ideas to get 300 ideas in the front end idea pool [8]. Approximately 50% of ideas that 
make it into the idea pool, are abandoned before any analytical project selection methods 
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are used, 10% make it to the business concept stage, only 4% get to the business 
development and just 1% of the projects succeed in the market [7] (See Figure ‎2.1). 
This makes R&D project selection a crucial task for any firm seeking new product 
success [17]. Project selection is a complicated decision making process that features 
multiple stages, multiple groups of decision makers, and often conflicting objectives, in 
addition to high risk and high levels of uncertainty in predicting future success and 
product impact on the market [18].  
 
Figure ‎2.1 New Product Development Funnel 
The NPD portion may be divided into three processes: first, the fuzzy front end 
(FFE), where ideas are screened, evaluated and turned into concepts; second, the product 
development stages, where all product developing planning; and third, designing and 
commercialization and marketing stages take place [19]. 
 A new product idea goes through different stages to eventually turn into a 
complete product; these stages ne zed special screening techniques to approve the product 
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to the next stage [20]. In addition, these screening techniques need to fit the purpose and 
characteristics of each stage. 
This first part of the literature review (2.1.1) examines the different NPD 
frameworks in which there are three different approaches that take the new idea until it 
turns into a final product. Then 2.1.2 narrows the focus to the very early stages of product 
development—the fuzzy front end, where it discusses the features of and the 
characteristics of this stage (2.1.2.1), summarizes the requirement of the screening 
methods needed at this FFE gate (2.1.2.2) and finally (2.1.2.3) emphasizes on the 
practices of FFE screening. 
2.1.1  New Product Development Frameworks 
NPD framework can be represented as a system whose elements are partially 
connected and have the capacity for autonomous decision making and social action [21]. 
From an idea to commercialization of a new product, there are many steps, processes and 
evaluation points. Evaluations occurring at any point greatly influence what will happen 
in the next stage. The principal role of NPD decision makers is to make judgments and 
choices to bridge the gap between the innovation idea and reality [21] and choose 
projects with potential success [21]. At screening gates one of three decision options need 
to be made: 1) commit resources needed and proceed forward with the product 
developing, 2) put the product development on hold waiting for future decision trigger, 3) 
drop the product completely from the development portfolio [20, 22]. 
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Given the importance and value of NPD, researchers have developed descriptive 
frameworks of the NPD process that reflect three different system views: the linear 
framework, the recursive framework, and the chaotic framework. Although these three 
frameworks provide different insights and descriptive theories about the NPD process 
structure and behavior, as summarized below, all of them describe selecting innovation 
idea in to the project pool as an area of uncertainty and fuzziness. 
Linear Frameworks 
Linear NPD frameworks represent the traditional and logical project management 
model, which divides the process of NPD into a series of events and activities, which are 
sequential and discrete in nature. The most well-known linear framework is the stage-
gate evaluation approach (sometimes called ‘game plans’ or ‘stage-gate systems’) [9, 20, 
23, 24]. This common framework divides NPD into stages that are separated by decision 
gates, which start with idea generation and then go through many other stages such as 
concept development, product design, product development, market testing, and 
culminate in a complete product ready to be launched. These stages are represented in 




Figure ‎2.2 Linear Framework of NPD Evaluation System 
 
Each stage is followed by a gate where evaluation takes place and a decision has to be 
made about whether to continue processing the project and move into the next stage or to 
kill it. Each gate consists of different combinations of technical and commercial 
evaluation sets that act as quality control check points for product development [20, 25]. 
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At the first gate, product opportunities and product ideas are screened to identify 
those ideas that are promising and should be developed further into product concepts. On 
average, only 10 out of 100 projects make it through this gate [27]. Filters at this gate 
should typically be designed to be fast, cheap, and not very permeable to give quick 
evaluations for projects in order to identify those projects that should be transferred to 
enter the full screening gate, and those project concepts that should simply be killed. 
Since there is little known about the project at this stage, decisions depend on a limited 
amount of information [20]. After a project passes the early screening gate, a detailed 
assessment is conducted by building a business case, setting the project plan, and 
studying the market in further detail including the competitive analysis, detailed technical 
appraisals and manufacturing assessment financial analysis [20]. As the development 
project proceeds, more information is collected about both technical and commercial 
feasibility. Because the information at these later stages is related to something tangible, 
the information has greater potential for being reliable and valid, and a decision can be 
made depending on this reliable information. When a project reaches the testing stages, 
the information will become more complete and encompass customer opinions, buying 
behavior, operation of the product in use, production and delivery, and the target market 
[25]. 
This stage-gate concept seeks to deliver appropriate outputs on time and within 
cost by applying process management techniques to enhance the effectiveness of the 
process, ease the task of setting goals toward completing each phase, improve focus on a 
particular phase, and reduce risk [21, 23]. Empirical research has found that stage-gate 
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processes reduce development time, produce marketable products, and optimize internal 
resources by eliminating projects which are not promising or likely successes [23]. 
However, the focus on process structure, reliability, and control has tended to ignore 
human behavior aspects and system features that fundamentally influence and affect the 
NPD process [21]. This happens because linear frameworks represent the NPD process as 
a mechanism that evaluates the activities in order, while ignoring other process factors 
such as flexibility, informality, feedback, and autonomy. This makes linear frame work 
more suitable for incremental innovation than for radical innovations [28]. 
Since new product development is increasingly managed with flexible decision 
points, researches proposed the recursive and chaotic NPD frameworks [29, 30], to give 
advanced interpretation and understanding of the activities that underlie the development 
of radical innovations [31-33]. 
Recursive Framework 
Critics of linear process models state that these models misrepresent the nature and 
direction of the innovation because innovation is a complex, uncertain, disorderly process 
during which the original idea usually changes many times through different stages [32]. 
Furthermore, Leonard-Barton [34] states that implementation is part of the innovation 
and the implementation of new technology cannot be separated from its creation. 
Therefore, a recursive framework has been proposed as one of the alternatives to the 
linear framework. A recursive framework is built on the fact that the most important 
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innovations go through essential changes during their life cycles and that these changes 
often transform the initial inventions into different products [32].  
A recursive framework represents NPD as multiple, concurrent and divergent 
activities that include chain-linked models recursive cycles feedback and feed-forward 
loops that describe the relationships and iterations among research, invention, innovation, 
and production [21, 32, 34, 35]. The decision of selecting an innovation idea to the 
production is affecting the rest of the chain. However, recursive models do not provide a 
structural format for the process, which make it hard to follow, and to systemize [32, 33]. 
Chaotic Framework 
The chaotic framework is an extension of the recursive framework that represents 
innovative NPD processes as a system with “nonlinear behavior that generate irregular 
or, disordered series of actions” [21] page 440 , where this system starts chaotically and 
finishes in more stable, systematic stages that are similar to the linear stages [33]. This 
view relies on research that suggests that front end activities (such as search, screening, 
and implementation) cannot be addressed separately from each other, and shows that the 
feedback loops as influential properties of these activities [36]. A chaotic framework is 
less structured than the other two frameworks and is hard to follow or adapt. Therefore, 
making a decision to take an idea from innovation to the product production tunnel does 
not have clear structure or follow any systematic model.  
The summary of these three models is presented in Table ‎2.1.  
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Table ‎2.1 Linear, Recursive, and Chaotic Frameworks of New Product 
Development [21] 
Linear Recursive Chaotic 
It is a simple and effective 
representation of relatively 
fixed, and discrete process 
for NPD, 
Project goes through 
sequential stages followed 
by evaluated gates. 
It does not consider the 
dynamic behaviors and 
relationships each stage 
and gate have once chance 
once the project pass it 
cannot go back. It 
represents a good fit for 
incremental innovation 
activities with relatively 
reliable market. 
A process is represented in 
a concurrent and multiple 
feedback loops between 
stages. These loops 
represent the dynamic and 
the nature of the process. 
However, it does not 
represent the structure or 
the behavioral format of 
the process. 
This model matched the 
need of radical innovations 
activities, technology 
transfer and competitive 
markets 
Representing different 
degrees of feedback 
across the process 
Where the initial stages 
are chaotic and dynamic, 
latter stages are 
relatively stable and 
certain. 
Recognizes different 
system behavior across 
process but does not 
consider the adaptability.  
It suits the needs of 
radical innovation 
research or new to the 
world products. 
Individually, each framework provides valuable insights about the behavior and 
structure of NPD processes. However, collectively, they are more than just rival 
frameworks. As a group, they provide rich and holistic interpretations of the NPD 
processes and facilitate a contingency theory approach [21]. The linear model assumes 
that an idea is only screened once at each gate and moves downstream or is abandoned – 
without going back. A recursive framework allows multiple screenings at the same level 
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to allow for learning; so screeners need to look for early screening tools that are easy to 
update. A chaotic framework may allow projects to progress without any clear screening 
at least in the early stages. Still, in these three models, the FFE suffers from “fuzziness” 
and uncertainty, and decision makers need quick and cheap screening tools to decide 
either to move forward or to eliminate the idea. Therefore, we study this early screening 
phase further more in the next section.  
2.1.2  Fuzzy Front End 
The real keys to NPD success can be found in the activities prior to the actual 
project development [20, 22, 37-40]. The very early stage of product development, 
known as the fuzzy front end (FFE), encompasses a variety of planning activities that 
precedes the concept, where the opportunity and risk are identified and assessed. The 
term FFF became frequently in use in the early ‘90s [1, 29]. The interest in the FFE as an 
important stage in the product development life cycle has recently increased [3, 5, 12, 41, 
42]. Pre-development activities are critical factors for project success, and play a great 
role before any resources or funds are allocated to projects [22, 23, 25, 43]. FFE is 
generally considered as one of the largest opportunities to improve and speed up the NPD 
process [1, 29]. Projects had a better success rate when managers spent more time and 
effort studying the new product and not skipping ahead to the project development stages 
[20, 40]. Cooper [20] found that when pre-development activities applied carefully, 
projects had about 75 percent success rate and 45.7 percent market share, while those 
projects lacking pre-development activities failed 70 percent of the time. Researchers 
have made efforts to evaluate the impact of the front end on NPD performance [2, 20, 22, 
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25, 37, 39, 40, 44, 45] and to examine the different processes used in the front end itself 
[19, 27, 29, 46, 47]. 
Research [2, 48, 49] considers the fuzzy front end as a series of actions that 
include idea generation, opportunity identification and assessment, product definition, 
project planning and executive reviews, product strategy formulation and 
communication. FFE decisions have three potential outcomes: identifying the project idea 
as a good idea that deserves further study and proceeding forward, procrastinating the 
project for future decision trigger, drop the project from the NPD pool [9]. 
In the screening stage, it is important to eliminate the project early if it has been 
tagged as likely to fail. Managerial problems arise in making two types of wrong 
decisions: rejecting successful projects (which has been known as a type A mistake) and 
continuing with a losing project (which been known as a type B mistake) [9, 29]. In the 
first case, when a company discards a winning project idea, it does not lose money from 
not developing the project, but the company does lose ultimate profit [9]. In the second 
case, even if the bad project is discovered in later stages, terminating a project after 
allocating resources to it is a difficult decision. If a project fails in later stages, the costs 
are likely unrecoverable [50]. In addition, choosing a weak project in early screening 
prevents good ideas from being developed with regard to limited resources and funds 
firms can offer for developing new ideas [50]. Some studies consider rejecting good ideas 
as a worse error than accepting losing projects because the profit that can be gained from 
a successful idea is greater than all the development costs combined [9]. Other studies 
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[29] consider accepting losing projects as the critical error that needs to be avoided. Table 
2.2 shows these two types of errors in project selection.  
Table ‎2.2 Types of Decision Error at the FFE 
Incoming Project 
Concept 
Decision can be made 
Reject the project Accept and move to next 
stage Bad Idea Correct decision Incorrect decision (Go 
error)  
(Type B) 
Good Idea Incorrect decision (Drop error)  
(Type A) 
Correct decision 
The FFE screening, however, does not only have to be effective, but also has to be 
done quickly and efficiently to keep the cost of screening acceptable. From an economic 
perspective, delaying making decisions at the FFE, until collecting more information or 
having market researches, may become more expensive than making a wrong decision at 
the early stage because the decision will be revisited in later stages. Reinertsen in their 
illustration [1, 29], estimated the average computed cost of delay for projects to reach 
$100,000 per month, with a six month average cycle time. On average, delay 
announcements of new product decrease the market value of the firm by 5.25% [51]. 
Thus, there are significant penalties for not introducing new products on time.  
2.1.2.1. Fuzzy Front End Features and Characteristics 
While the later stages deal with fewer numbers of projects, the early screening 
stage deals with tens, sometimes hundreds of R&D project concepts proposed for 
screening, which makes the number of screening decisions that need to be made, very 
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large [52]. Since the initial screening is more concerned with identifying ideas that can be 
developed into concepts and can be evaluated for their technical feasibility and market 
potential, rather than providing detailed analysis, screening should not be very 
sophisticated and accurate and furthermore limited by the large number of projects that 
need to be screened, the limited time available, and a lack of information [25, 29]. 
The main challenge in making decisions during the project screening stage is 
uncertainty. Information available at this stage is incomplete, which makes estimating 
project success difficult [2, 9, 11, 27, 29, 39]. As projects move through the development 
stages, the amount of data increases dramatically and the quality of available information 
improves [9]. More and more information is available at the commercialization stages, 
but by then, it is too late to cancel a project [22, 50] without incurring high losses. 
The FFE stage has characteristics that make screening projects at this stage 
different than other later stages. These characteristics of FFE make decisions at the early 
stages of product development critical, and require screening approaches that can work 
with limited data and time, and effectively link business strategy and product strategy to 
product-specific decisions [9, 38, 46]. They are summarized in Table ‎2.3, which 
compares FFE screening characteristics with the characteristics of full screening and later 
screening. Full screening results in the decision to develop a product or not, whereas late 
screening takes place towards the end of product development to decide if a product is 
ready for the customer of not [9]. We compare these three stages in terms of number of 
project evaluated, data availability and reliability, and the time available to make such 
decision. This evaluation takes place at a scale level from high (H) to Low (L). 
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Table ‎2.3 Levels of Evaluation Variables in Different Stages of Product 
Development 
 
2.1.2.2. Requirements of FFE Screening Methods 
FFE Screening is an essential step to save limited resources for worthwhile 
projects. The goal of early screening is to determine the “big loser projects,” to drop them 
out of the NPD pool, and spot the potential winners to proceed forward to be able to hit 
the competitive market while the opportunity window is still open [9]. The layout of the 
screening ‘filters’ should take the cost of filtering, the cost of time delaying and the cost 
of errors into account [30]. Since the project goes through many stages, where there are 
many check points, the ‘Go’ decision, made at the early gates, is not an irreversible 
decision. Early stages’ decisions do not commit all needed resources for the entire 
project; it just moves the project forward for the next stage. NPD team has the flexibility 














H  L H  L H  L H  L 
FFE Screening X     X   X   X 
Full Screening  X   X   X   X  
Late Screening   X X   X X   X X 
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indications of project failure are found [11, 38]. Since wrong decisions are still reversible, 
information is scarce, and managers do not have time to study all proposed ideas in 
detail, a ‘good enough’ evaluation of project concepts is accepted at this stage. FFE 
screening criteria are different than criteria used for other screening gates, because of the 
nature of the FFE. For the limited information available at the FFE screening, criteria 
may not always be quantitative or comparable and/or they might differ from one project 
to another depending on the goal and the nature of each project; and so, these criteria 
should carefully be selected and weighted to the best use of the FFE screening [25]. New 
product development is dealing with R&D innovations ideas; some of these innovations 
are new to the world, which require flexible and visionary evolution to assess the quality 
of these ideas.  
As a result, FFE screening method should be designed to be flexible enough to 
consider new ideas and multiple objectives, to allow criteria changes, to provide a good 
enough evaluation of project concepts fast and cheap, and to be easy to implement and 
use criteria [1, 20, 29, 38, 53]. 
The unique characteristics of FFE screening (Table ‎2.4) will be used later to 
develop criteria to be used in evaluating the current screening practices and screening 
methods proposed in the literature in the subsequent Chapter (2.2). 
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Table ‎2.4 FFE Characteristics 
Limited accurate information 
Limited time and resources 
Evaluating criteria might change, depending on the project and changing 
environment 
Incremental and radical innovation projects need to be evaluated not in comparison 
with previous projects 
Project proposals are typically screened one-by-one (not as a group) 
Seeking ‘good enough’ if not ‘optimal’ results from a reliable method. 
Fuzziness and uncertainty. 
2.1.2.3. FFE Project Screening Practice 
A review of project screening and evaluation practices shows that managers tend 
to use project management decision models near the end of the development process, 
where there is more information available, and market uncertainties become more 
important than technical uncertainties [9, 25, 52]. Relatively little time or money is spent 
on the up front activities [20, 38-40]. On average, only seven percent of the project’s total 
expenditures and only sixteen percent of the person-days are devoted to these critical 
predevelopment activities [39]. 
Cooper [22], after studying 252 new product cases from 123 companies and 
interviewing the new product managers, found that initial screening was undertaken in 
over 90 percent of the projects. However, it is rated as the weakest evaluation activity, 
scoring lowest on the proficiency scale, and noted as an activity that needs great 
improvement. While decisions are supposed to be made on the basis of rational analysis 
22 
 
of potential profitability, in 60 percent of the cases examined by Cooper [37], screening 
decisions were made by a single individual or an informal group, based on informal 
decision techniques.  
Another study by Hart [25] that surveys of 166 managers from companies that 
develop and manufacture industrial products in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
found that about 58 percent of the managers use intuition as one of the most important 
evaluation techniques in the concept screening stage. Research [20, 22, 37, 40] show that 
gut feeling, past experiences, faith in certain individuals, hopeful guesses, and wishful 
thinking seem to be the decision factors in most cases. Ideas are rejected intuitively as a 
result of informal peer discussion or one or more levels of supervisory review [52], and if 
decision aids are used at all, they are very simple. Checklists are used in group decisions 
in about 11.6 percent of the cases, while in less than 2 percent of the cases, evaluators 
used a formal checklist questionnaire or scoring model to rate projects [38]. These facts 
indicate that few managers are taking advantage of the available management science 
tools, most likely because these tools fail to reach their full potential in the FFE screening 
[54]. Research [22, 26, 38, 40] show that this is due to a lack of simple systematic 
managerial approaches that fit with the nature of new products that require innovation 
[55]. Because these techniques are unable to consider strategic factors or to use the 
imperfect and incomplete information available at this early stage of NPD, they tend to 
be complex and time consuming [17, 56, 57].  
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2.1.3  Summary and Discussion- Part 1-New Product Development 
The discussion above has shown that all frameworks for NPD characterize the 
FFE as a distinct phase of the development process that is different from later 
development stages because of the large number of ideas need to be screened, because 
information and time are limited, and because screening criteria need to be adapted to 
changing projects. 
Presently, front end decisions are often based on non-analytical factors, poorly 
documented and stretch over a long period of time, rather than resulting in a clear 
decision to pursue a project or reject it [27, 29, 39, 47]. Consequently, many practitioners 
express dissatisfaction with the front end process [20], which is presently not fast and not 
successful enough. As a result, new approaches to decision making are urgently required 
[2, 47].  
Management science has provided solutions for NPD screening at the downstream 
end of the development process where data is available to feed elaborate models. 
However, it did not offer much for the front end, where simplicity is virtue, and the 
gathering of information and use of complex models could result in long time delays and 
high costs. In these early stages, the use of simple and possibly less reliable screening 
methods is acceptable, because decision errors are cheap, since they will soon be caught 
at a subsequent checkpoint. It is therefore acceptable to sacrifice decision quality and 
choose a simpler, faster, and less expensive evaluation method. Decision aids for FFE 
screening must be able to address the needs of the FFE process [25, 38, 50, 52]. The next 
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section reviews different decision making methods that have been proposed for project 
selection, in terms of their applicability for screening projects at the FFE. 
 
2.2  An Evaluation of Decision Models for Project Screening 
With regard to the characteristics identified previously and summarized in Table 
‎2.4, there are only few publications that evaluate the managerial decision tools with 
regard to their usefulness under different situations [54, 57]. “Most research in the area of 
opportunity identification has presented the procedures and theoretical foundation of a 
single method, and little has been done to assess methods in terms of their 
appropriateness” [54] page 182. Even fewer publications comment on the value of 
screening methods for the early stages of new product development. 
This section aims to close this gap in Management Science literature, by assessing 
the most well-known decision models for project screening based six criteria developed 
based on the FFE characteristics identified previously. These criteria are summarized in 
Table ‎2.5. These criteria are used to assess the appropriateness of decision methods to 
eliminate the losing projects and identify the potential winners at the FFE. 
Five classes of decision tools will be covered in this study: analogy-based models, 
which screen projects by comparing them to historically successful projects, economic 
decision models, which exclusively rely on financial data to evaluate projects, multi 
criteria decision models, which consider a variety of different criteria, decision trees that 
illustrate the probabilities of alternative outcomes, and finally the heuristic decision 
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models which are simple rules of thumbs that individuals and groups use to reach a 
decision. 
Table ‎2.5 Criteria Used to Evaluate FFE Screening Methods 
Evaluation criteria Description 
Information Ability to perform using limited accurate data  
Time  Fast and cheap to be used to evaluate many projects 
Flexibility in Changing 
Criteria 
Flexibility to use different criteria 
Independent 
Evaluation  
Ability to assess projects independently, not comparatively 
with other proposed projects or historical data 
Evaluate Single 
project  
Can be used to evaluate single project not group of projects 
Operational 
usefulness 
Freedom from ambiguity regarding interpretation of inputs 
required from the decision maker 
Overall quality of performance is good enough if not 
optimal 
Codification  Transparency of the logic of the decision method 
Conceptually, these models, except heuristics, were built based on the classical 
decision theory, which represents the decision situation as a decision matrix that consists 
of information, alternatives, and outcomes. 
They determine the outcomes by evaluating the value of each alternative under 
the decision situation [58, 59]. However, these models vary with respect to their 
objectives, performance, applicability to different projects, data requirements, suitable 
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environment, time frames, and diagnostics [60]. Table ‎2.6 shows these models with their 
respective application areas. 
Table ‎2.6 Category of Decision Making Models 
Method Key approach Application area References 
Analogies Comparison of current 
projects to historical 
data of similar products 
and search for an 
optimal 
solution/alternative with 
regard to some objective 
functions 
Project idea has suitable 
analogy with previous 
projects or has been 








with regard to multiple 
criteria and based on 
preference of decision 
makers  
Project idea and its attribute 
are clearly defined and 
decision makers' 






Forecasting of financial 
outcomes 
Project idea has well known 








scenarios, for which the 
probability is known, 
based on a single 
criterion (typically 
Project idea, alternative 
scenarios, and their 
probability are well-known  




Heuristics  Using general knowledge 
"rules of thumbs" to 
solve problems 
Project ideas with limited 
available information; 




2.2.1  Analogies  
Analogy-based models are comparative models that use historical data to create 
statistical models that compare the current projects with data from previous projects to 
compute the probability of project success and the overall value of the project [83]. This 
method helps to predict project performance and helps companies to determine the 
market effort required to achieve similar results when the nature of the projects and the 
environment are similar [60]. 
The New Prod Model, proposed by Cooper [38], is an example of a well-known 
analogy-based decision model that contains a large amount of data organized in a 
database system and used to assist mangers in making NPD screening decisions while 
depending on comparisons with the historical data saved in a database. 
Analogy-based models that use multiple regression models are popular methods 
for forecasting when data on relevant independent variables (or attributes) is available. 
Although many researchers [50, 55, 60] support the opinion that analogies models lay 
down a good foundation for NPD decision methodology [55], they considered several 
limitations for such methods. It was found that these models perform relatively poor as 
forecasting tool when there is no enough information available, compared with the 
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performance of other forecasting models given similar amounts of available information. 
Even forecasts based on human judgment outperformed multiple regressions in some 
cases [64, 92, 114]. 
Since the evaluation of analogies models is based on comparisons with past 
project experience of some companies from different industries, these historical 
experiences were sometimes found to not be applicable to the current projects because of 
rapid changes in markets and technologies or because of the difference between 
companies’ practices and backgrounds. A key finding from Hassard et al.’s study [115] is 
that new product developers rely on an initial analogy even in the face of overwhelming 
evidence of the inappropriateness of that particular analogy; suitable analogies may not 
exist for ‘new to the world’ products, and, in general, it requires many details about the 
new project which may not be available at the FFE stage. 
The decision criteria used in the evaluation are usually fixed, and based on 
judgments made by multidisciplinary teams that constitute members from different 
departments and different industries which may differ from the industry at hand [50]. 
Analogy-based models (especially the new software built to perform all calculations) are 
easy to use and comprehend, but they do not provide a logical mechanism to produce 
group judgments in the evaluation of projects [55, 74]. 
2.2.2  Multi Criteria Decision Models 
Multiple Criteria Decision Models (MCDM) have been defined as “a formal approach 
to types of problem solving (or mess reduction), lies in attempting to represent such 
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imprecise goals in terms of a number of individual (relatively precise, but generally 
conflicting) criteria” [57] page 569. Using MCDM requires decision makers to state clear 
objectives and goals, review the different alternatives using the consistent set of chosen 
criteria, then determine the outcomes using a utility measure [38, 59]. They are widely 
used approaches for project selection, because they can be flexibly adapted to decision 
makers objectives and preferences and because they help to keep the judgment objectives 
clear [38, 55]. Three of the popular MCDM (scoring models, AHP, and the fuzzy based 
decision models), will be studied the next regard to their relative applicability for project 
screening at the FFE. 
2.2.2.1. Scoring Model 
Scoring models are multi criteria decision models that evaluate projects under 
different criteria, and use mathematical formulas or algebraic expressions to calculate the 
outcomes [72, 83]. Scoring models can take the shape of an arrangement checklist criteria 
with weights of importance assigned to each criterion. After evaluating the project 
concepts using these criteria, all weights are mathematically combined to come up with 
project score. Project scores are compared against other alternative projects or against 
historical data to help make decisions and select a certain project [9, 72]. 
It takes time to develop a scoring evaluation system, but once it is designed, it 
does not require much effort to run it. Scoring models are usually used for group 
evaluation where each team member assigned weight for the project under each criterion 
depending on their personal judgment with regard to the available data. There are various 
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mathematical methods to combine the individual team members’ ratings, which needs a 
certain level of knowledge and experience [9]. 
2.2.2.2. Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), which was developed in 1980 by Thomas 
Saaty, systematically compiles groups of expert judgments to choose an alternative 
among different choices in a certain issue [57, 79]. It is a powerful decision technique to 
tackle complex problems of choice and prioritization [9, 50, 83]. AHP builds a hierarchal 
structure for the problem and effectively integrates the evaluation of the entire 
hierarchical model [18, 75]. After identifying the company’s objective, different levels of 
judgment criteria should be identified and prioritized against each other on a pair-wise 
comparison; this comparison is done by using a ratio scale to indicate the strength of 
preference, followed by assigning a numerical score to each of the alternatives with 
respect to each of the attributes. The final outputs would be based on a combination of 
the weighted sum of scores [9, 50, 75, 79]. 
AHP is recognized as a powerful tool in solving problems. Its strength is in the 
systematic approach to structure complex multi-criteria decisions in several steps. Its 
evaluation is not based on historical statistical data; instead, it makes judgments based on 
comparative evaluation for multi projects against each other [50, 73, 79]. On the 
application level, there are several advantages of using AHP in project selection over 
other alternative project selection and prioritization techniques. AHP is a tool that 
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provides practitioners with greater analytical capabilities to examine what-if scenarios 
[50, 55, 73, 74, 79]. 
AHP model gives decision makers some flexibility to choose and modify 
evaluation criteria, depending on the situations, and distribute them in many different 
levels regarding to their importance and related to the objective. It, however, has some 
potential drawbacks: 1) building the hierarchical model and weighting procedure is time 
consuming and it is hard to understand and needs a certain level of experience to develop 
the model [79], 2) AHP requires decision makers to weight each attribute against each 
other using some scoring values, and then score the alternative in the same way; this 
requires significant effort to achieve consensus between the managers who evaluate these 
criteria, 3) the weights and scores imply trade-offs between pairs of alternatives on 
different attributes, which may not be adequate. 4) when some of the attributes used in 
the evaluation fail to differentiate among the alternatives, the results of the scores will not 
be adequate and the true differences will not be clear [77, 79]. 
There is an ongoing debate among researchers about the performance and the 
applications of AHP. [69-71, 77, 116] have criticized AHP because it suffers from rank 
reversal: the rank of alternatives changes when another alternative, even a relatively 
unimportant one, is added or excluded from the set of options [55, 74, 77] or when a 




In its application, AHP requires mathematical effort, and once the hierarchical 
structure has been weighted, a change in criteria means making new comparisons and 
recalculating all of the weights [74].  
Although AHP is a powerful model that is useful in gathering and processing 
knowledge for making decisions, this study shows that it is unsuitable for FFE screening 
decision. 
2.2.2.3. Fuzzy Logic Methods 
Fuzzy logic methods are another multi criteria decision tool derived from the 
fuzzy theory and is applied to help in making decisions in complex, ambiguous, and 
vague situations [18, 76]. A fuzzy set is ‘fuzzy’ in the sense that their elements have 
different degrees of membership to the set they belong to [117]. Mathematically, a fuzzy 
set can be defined by assigning a value to each possible member in a universe 
representing its grade of membership. Membership in the fuzzy set to a greater or lesser 
degree is indicated by a larger or smaller membership grade. Members’ value, within a 
set, can range from zero to one [18, 117]. If x is a set of objects, then a fuzzy set A in X is 
a set of ordered pairs A = (x, µ(x)), where x is an element of X in A, and µ(x) is degree of 
membership of x in A, and µ is a function that determine the degree of membership of the 
elements of the set [109, 117]. The major contribution of the fuzzy theory is its capability 
of representing vague data and allowing mathematical operators and programming to 
apply to the fuzzy domain [78]. 
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Some application model use vague, everyday language like ‘equally’, 
‘moderately’, ‘strongly’, ‘extremely, and ‘to a significant degree,’ as fuzzy values in 
order to quantify uncertain events and objects [74]. When linguistic variables are used, 
numeric values replace the linguistic values using specific functions later on in the 
process to calculate the final assessment value of each alternative to compare the results 
[8, 49]. Another applications of fuzzy logic in project screening combine AHP with fuzzy 
logic to make the judgment between alternatives more intuitive and eliminate the 
assessment bias caused by the pair-wise comparison process [76, 78]. 
Fuzzy logic thus enables decision makers to tackle the ambiguities effectively and 
efficiently, quantify imprecise information, perform reasoning processes, and reach 
decisions based on vague and incomplete data [18, 74]. Using the concepts of multi-
criteria decision making and fuzzy logic, managers evaluate the criteria and the product 
ideas with regard to those criteria; instead of using numeric values to weigh these criteria, 
they use fuzzy measurements [27, 76]. A project that earns higher scores in comparison 
with other projects would be elected to be funded. 
The fuzzy model has to be customized to fit with a company’s specific 
environment and the situation; this allows the company to use the criteria and the 
measurement that fits with its needs. This, however, is time consuming and needs a 
certain level of experience from mangers in order to work efficiently [36]. Applying the 
fuzzy logic require learning the fuzzy measures and the interpretation of these measures. 
The computation of a fuzzy weighted average is complicated and not easily done by 
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managers, so, these calculations have to be computerized to increase accuracy and reduce 
the amount of time taken [76]. 
2.2.2.4. Conclusion on using Multi Criteria Decision Models for FFE 
Screening  
One of the limitations of MCDM is its need for information on criteria, criteria 
weights, and criteria values. This information may not be available in the FFE and if it is, 
its collection may result in long time delays and high costs. 
The main shortcomings of MCDM for FFE screening, however, is the operational 
usefulness; this is not just because it’s built to be used by experts, but also because 
MCDMs suffer from a lack of transparency with regard to the logic of the method used to 
the decision maker. This happens due to several reasons; first, it may be hard to describe 
a new project with regard to a predefined set of criteria and even some very capable firms 
find that they cannot translate the new project to a complete scoring model and prefer to 
answer basic questions for screening, rather than using scoring models [9]. In addition, it 
is unlikely that the names, or labels, given to the criteria are interpreted similarly by all 
evaluators [64]. Furthermore, the choice and naming of criteria has to be done carefully 
to make sure that all important variables are considered and properly named and do not 
contradict each other [38]. 
Second, MCDM does not have a systematic approach to translate experts’ 
judgments into weights (numbers or words) that are attached to each screening variable. 
Different people have different personalities that might affect the way they score. 
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Research indicates that some people are always optimistic, while some are neutral and 
their scores are always in the middle. Many scores are far from reliable and accurate, 
some scorers are easily swayed by group opinion, and some scorers are erratic [9]. All of 
these different types of personalities affect the weight of the criteria and how alternatives 
are judged; a perfect score for someone may mean 90 percent while it may be translated 
to 60 percent by others. Therefore, not having a clear systematic method of discerning 
these evaluations could cause ambiguity in translating the results [9]. 
Another shortcoming refers to the quality of the evaluation process, where 
MCDM treats the attribute weights and the performance scores of alternatives on each 
attribute in the same way. Research [55] suggests to evaluate the performance of an 
alternative on each attribute independent of other alternatives, therefore, the performance 
should be measured by using independent standards or common scales. Models that score 
projects in comparison with other alternatives would pick the best of the bad projects 
when a set of bad alternatives is proposed. In a case of having many alternatives with the 
same level of importance to the decision makers, the final scores of the alternatives may 
be too close to each other which will lead the decision maker to another dilemma, i.e., to 
pick one by guessing [74]. 
2.2.3  Economic Models  
Economic analysis models are based on financial criteria and capital budget 
techniques. The most commonly used economic criteria are the net present value (NPV), 
payback period discounted cash flow (DCF), internal rate of return (IRR), and return on 
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investment (ROI). There are many techniques that can help assist managers in estimating 
the market segments, and use financial criteria in making decisions [9, 82, 84, 118]. 
However, practically, the contribution of these models to R&D projects screening is little 
[9, 50]. Research found that there is a lack of use of financial criteria in the first two 
evaluation gates of the NPD process [25]. At the front end of proposal evaluation, there is 
some estimation of the financial criteria, depending on forecasting of market segments 
and knowing some expectations of the costs and revenues estimated based on previous 
experiences [38, 82, 84, 118].; however, when project is new, collecting reliable financial 
information, or estimating on require a long period of time, which makes it difficult to 
assist the decision makers at the FFE with accurate financial data. This makes the use of 
economic and market approaches less valuable at this early stage [9, 33, 39]. 
According to Crawford and Benedetto [9], the philosophy that calls for the 
financial analysis as early as possible to avoid wasting resources on poor projects is 
wrong because it leads firms to make complex analyses very early where the results are 
inadequate, which leads companies to unnecessarily kill ideas that would have looked 
great after further development. In addition, these economic methods consider only a 
single criterion which is the financial return, while R&D screening requires evaluation of 
projects with regard to many different criteria. 
In addition, financial tools such as IRR, NPV, and DCF, suffer from a lack of 
flexibility, and fail to encompass uncertainties and to capture the strategic importance for 
investment [86]. Since financial criteria are important and need to be evaluated in order 
to make good decision, therefore financial analysis should be built piece by piece along 
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with the product development, incorporating continuous upgrades and assessing the 
information as it becomes available [9], and the available information should be used in 
project evaluation [25, 82, 86]. 
2.2.4  Decision Tree 
Decision trees are well established methodologies for decision analysis that 
involve structuring the problem into small sequenced tasks which represent different 
scenarios and expectations of future events. These tasks are analyzed and assigned 
numerical values, which represent estimated probabilities and confidence limits of each 
task or criteria values, and end up with consequential outcomes. These outcomes are 
estimated and compared by applying the principle of maximum expected utility to 
determine the best project [52, 83]. 
A decision tree can be customized and built for each individual case by choosing 
the criteria needed to be analyzed, estimating the values of each criteria and action. In 
case of limited accurate data, the decision maker can assign probability for uncertain 
variables and performances. Each project is analyzed and screened individually, not 
comparatively with any other project(s), and the final selection decision is made 
depending on the probability of the projects’ outcomes. Constructing a decision tree, 
however, is time consuming and requires experience as well as analytical and statistical 
knowledge. When a problem is large and complex, developing a decision tree can be a 
complicated task because the tree grows exponentially and actions are hard to predict and 
interpret. In addition, changing criteria after the tree is built would mean making critical 
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changes to the decision tree. All of this makes the decision tree an inflexible model for 
FFE project screening [83]. 
2.2.5  Heuristics 
Heuristics are simple strategies or “rules of thumb” that humans employ for 
solving problems. They follow behavior and logic quite different than the consequential 
logic [119], minimize the amount of mental effort invested in making a decision [92, 95, 
120, 121], and cannot guarantee optimal solutions [122]. Heuristics are part of a decision 
maker’s acquired repertoire of cognitive strategies for solving judgment problems [102]. 
They trade off the effort involved in making a choice against the accuracy of that choice 
[123, 124]. Instead of taking all available information into consideration, they focus on 
only one or very few attributes that suffice to discern decision alternatives in a particular 
situation. They are therefore characterized as ecologically rational [114] to contrast them 
against the concept of rationality as optimization.  
In practice, most decisions are based on managerial intuition, rather than 
analytical approaches Consequently, managers heavily rely on intuition or gut feel in 
order to decide which project ideas to fund and to subsequently move to development and 
which ones to abandon [19, 22, 47, 125-127]. because managers are not familiar with 
more sophisticated processes, find them computationally too demanding [128], or do not 
have access to the type of input data that is required for advanced decision models [129 , 
130]. Their decision approaches are based on single or very few decision criteria and are 
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consequently largely at odds with the detailed catalogues of decision criteria for new 
project selection that are proposed in the literature [38, 50, 55, 74]. 
Although the reliance on managerial heuristics is recognized as a source of 
systematic decision errors [127] and has been linked to poor FFE outcomes [39], 
managerial heuristics also provide a quick and inexpensive way to clear the product 
evaluation system of unwanted ideas before they eat up resources for front end evaluation 
[9]. Furthermore early decision errors are assumed to have no severe consequences: If a 
good idea is wrongly rejected through managerial gut-feel, there are always other good 
ideas that can come in its place [29]. Also, if a bad idea is wrongly accepted, it does not 
cost much to mature it a little further and correct the mistake at a later decision gate that 
is based on more analytical approaches [29]. Heuristics are consequently accepted as an 
inferior, but nevertheless useful decision approach, as long as it limited to routine 
decision or very early screening decisions that can be revised later, and as long as 
decision makers strive to reduce their biases by making team, rather than individual 
decisions, by keeping records, and by providing sufficient background data [9]. However, 
for important and complex problems, with multiple and possibly conflict objectives and 
level of uncertainty rational decision models are greatly recommended [131]. 
Accordingly, the use of ‘non analytical factors’ or ‘gut feeling’ in project selection is 
widely criticized [37, 47]. 
New heuristics research demonstrates and advocates for the adequacy of 
heuristics as a shortcut decision rule that can approximate rational decision making: 
Astebro and Elhedhli [112] investigated the decision behavior of a panel of experts that 
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predicts the success of entrepreneurial start-ups and model the experts’ decision approach 
as a simple conjunctive heuristic that ignores some cues and weighs all other cues the 
same. This simple heuristic outperforms a statistically derived decision rule with optimal 
weights. 
Research conducted by the author [132] investigated the performance of three 
F&F screening heuristics, as well as the performance of variations of a regression model, 
which serve as models for compensatory judgment behavior. Results show that two out of 
the three simple heuristics reach accuracies of over 80% for project selection and 70% for 
project rejection, while using as little as only one decision criterion. The best F&F 
model’s performance is close to that of the best regression model, which correctly 
identifies 76% of the successes and 87% of the failures, but requires complex 
calculations. The best average performance was reached with a regression model that 
only considered four of seven decision criteria. These findings support the dominant view 
on managerial heuristics in front end screening that justifies the use of simple heuristics 
that focus on a small number of highly relevant criteria, rather than screening all 
available information to provide quick and no-cost decision gate that is “good enough” 
by the requirements laid out in the literature [9, 29]. 
From a theoretical perspective it is therefore possible that heuristics provide an 
appropriate method for FFE screening that helps decision makers to operate effectively 
when time and information are limited. Practitioners report that some decision makers are 
particularly successful at selecting good projects [10]. It is possible that these individuals 
use heuristics that perform as well as or even better than the best regression model, which 
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did not outperform the best F&F heuristic by much. To date, however, the structure of 
managerial screening heuristics is unknown. Heuristic decision making has 
predominantly been investigated for less complex decision problems that have lower 
stakes than project screening, such size estimates for cities [92]. More research of "real 
world" front end screening behavior is therefore needed, to understand the decision 
making process managers’ use and the way they evaluate criteria to enable us forecasting 
what decisions are likely to be made, and to help optimizing the front end funnels.  
2.2.6  Summary and Discussion- Part2: Decision Models 
The five most popular decision approaches for project screening and their 
application have been studied in part 2 of this chapter to assess their ability to fit the 
needs of FFE screening. The results of this review are summarized in Error! Reference 
ource not found. where columns represent the screening requirements that need to be 
met and the rows show the different decision approaches covered in this study. The table 
shows how well the screening method fulfills the requirements on a continuum from high 
(H) = fulfills requirements very well to low (L) = does not fulfill the requirement, except 
the codification column, which takes a yes value if the method has been well 
documented, and no if it is not. With regard to the level of information that needs to be 
collected about a project, we can see that MCDM and Heuristics models need relatively 
little data, because they depend on expert evaluation or weight on probability. The 
amount of information that needs to be collected also impacts the time needed to build 
the model and to come up with a decision. Heuristics have very low time demands, 
whereas economic models take a lot of time to build and operate. When assessing the 
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flexibility to introduce new criteria or change existing ones without redesigning the 
problem, we found that analogy-based models and those built on financial data are 
usually fixed models that provide no room to introduce new criteria. MCDM and decision 
tree allow changing criteria but require recalculating all weights and probabilities in all 
levels. Heuristics provide the greatest flexibility. With the exception of MCDM and 
analogy-based models, all models are capable of evaluating a single project without 
comparison to other alternatives. For all of these models, it is either hard to develop or 
modify the model (you have to rebuild the decision tree and the MCDM hierarchy and 
redo all the calculation if you want to make any changes) or performing the calculation or 
reading the results need a certain level of experience and not easy to be used. Almost all 
models are furthermore based on previous researches and are well documented and 
codified. The only exception are heuristics, which little has been known about. 
Two methods, MCDMs and heuristics, stand out because they fulfill almost of the 
requirements. MCDMs can deal with low levels of information, do not depend on 
historical data and are flexible to use. However, MCDM are comparative models that are 
designed to select the best alternative from a given set of projects, which makes them ill-
suited for the evaluation of individual projects. Furthermore, they need certain level of 
experience about developing and using the model and time consuming. 
Theoretically, heuristics show the opportunity to fit the needs of the FFE very 
well. However, since managers use their rules of thumb in an undocumented and possibly 
even unconscious way, little is known about which heuristics are being used for project 




Table ‎2.7 Evaluation for Potential FFE Screening Methods 
(shaded areas show the desired range) 
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2.3 Heuristics from Bounded Rationality to Ecological Rationality -The State of 
Art 
Since early 1800s, heuristics have been defined as strategies that guide 
information search and modify problem representations to facilitate solutions [114]. 
Though heuristics are recognized for their ability to solve problems that cannot be 
handled by the logic of probability theory [133], in the past 40 years, they have been 
regarded as an inferior technique for decision making that is source of irrational decision 
behavior [114, 134-136]. Recently, behavioral decision making researchers like [92, 109] 
and managerial publications like [96, 137, 138], have demonstrated that some heuristics 
are highly efficient and can compete with complex decision models in some application 
domains. 
The following section explores the different streams of research and summarizes 
the current state of art techniques in heuristic decision. Drawing from psychological and 
managerial research, this chapter starts with defining and explaining the origins of 
heuristics and cognitive maps (section 2.3.1). Then, (section 2.3.2) it presents a brief 
description of theoretical foundations and the key concepts of present day research on 
heuristics going from the ideal rational decision theory, contrasting it with behavioral 
decision that are based on the observation of real-world decisions by describing the 
bounded rationality theory [136, 139, 140] and heuristics and bias theory [134]. The rest 
of the chapter (section 2.3.3) represents the recent research on heuristics focusing on 
studying the structured fast and frugal heuristics, which are at the center of current 
research and potential useful approach for FFE screening. 
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2.3.1  Definitions and Background 
In social science, heuristics are the general problem solving strategies that people 
apply for certain classes of situations [141]. They are often characterized as rules of 
thumb or specialized problem solving strategies that follow logic quite different than the 
consequential logic [102, 119].  
The term heuristics in the industrial world does not exactly match the term in 
behavioral decision making. In industry, a heuristic is a mathematical model, with 
specified procedure, that is implemented in software and used to find the best solution for 
a problem in a well structured environment [90, 91] that humans have not been able to 
solve because of problem complexity or the need for calculation that lie beyond the 
capacity of hand methods and the cognitive systems [91]. In this research, however, we 
use the term heuristics to mean the behavioral problem solving strategy, not the computer 
heuristic. 
Heuristics are sophisticated reasoning tools based on schemas (or mental databases) 
that experts hone over years of experience [96, 103, 138, 141] education, and through the 
process of latent (hidden) learning [138, 141]. Human brains use knowledge and 
experience to develop expectancy or cognitive representation of “what leads to what”; 
these representations are called cognitive maps [141]. The knowledge stored in these 
cognitive maps is not always applied instantaneously but may only be used and tested 
later, when there is a stimulus to perform: when a decision maker faces a situation that 
requires judgment, his or her brain summarize the situation at hand and identifies the 
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important attributes. Then, it starts searching for a pattern between the new situation and 
what it has experienced or learnt before. After it recognizes the similarities, it starts to fill 
in the missing details and make assumptions based on previous experiences. Thus, the 
human cognitive system develops a ‘sense of what counts as relevant’ to identify the 
important attributes, the goals that need to be accomplished and the expectations. When 
the situation is not exactly the same as previous situations a person has experienced, the 
human cognitive system uses previous experiences to develop a sense of what could work 
[122, 138, 141]. This pattern matching is known as the Recognition Primed Decision 
(RPD) [138].  
These problem-solving skills are not based on strategic analytical thinking; 
instead they resemble a mental map or schema generated out of a cognitive conclusion 
based on practices, experiences and emotional inputs gained over the years [126, 142]. 
The process of latent learning and pattern matching allows humans to learn and solve 
problems by insights. Different experiences in different decision environments determine 
different cognitive styles, which lead to differences in the quality of heuristic decisions 
[96, 138]. Over the last few decades, the usefulness and limitation of human heuristics is 
matter of considerable debate in the in the literature and has resulted in the development 
of competing decision theories. 
2.3.2  Theoretical Foundations and Key Concepts 
Early works on rational decision were mainly normative and describe how 
decisions should rationally be made. Later research was more behavioral focused and 
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described how decisions are made. This lead to the insights that humans suffer from 
bounded rationality which causes them to use cognitive shortcuts and heuristics that do 
not follow the principles of rational decision [114, 134, 136, 139, 140]. The most popular 
theories that affected the way research looked at heuristics in the last six decades are 
summarized in the subsequent sections. 
2.3.2.1. Rational Decision Theory 
Rational decision theory, also known as choice theory or rational action theory, 
considers the utility theory, proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947, as the 
normative and effective theory for human behavior to seek the most cost-effective 
alternative to achieve a specific goal [143]. It assumes that the decision maker can 
identify the best solution by computing, with perfect accuracy, how different decision 
alternatives will pay out, and then choose the alternative that maximizes the value of 
outcomes [89, 144, 145]. Rational decision theory relies on an extensive use of 
mathematical logic to represent decision situations and model uncertainty through 
probabilities. It usually represents preferences with a utility function, the mathematical 
function that assigns a numerical value to each possible alternative facing the decision 
maker [144]. This choice is based on two assumptions about the future: a guess about the 
future state of the world which is contingent upon the choices the decision maker makes 




The strength of the rational approaches used in decision making is in their rigor. 
Working within the decision theoretic framework allows one to identify answers and to 
weigh the alternatives within the framework. These approaches encompass a substantial 
amount of educational content that is straightforward to teach and to test [119]. 
It did not describe how people make decision; instead it describes how people 
should make decision. Later researches accept the laws of probability and statistics as 
normative, but they disagree about whether humans can stand up to these norms and 
introduced the concept of bounded rationality [114]. 
2.3.2.2. Bounded Rationality Theory 
In many real-world problems, the exact consequences of a choice are unknown; 
information about alternatives is also unknown or inherently uncertain. Uncertainty may 
exist because some processes are vague at the fundamental level, decision makers are 
ignorant of the driving mechanism which makes the outcomes look uncertain to them, or 
because of dependency on unexpected future events [119]. Furthermore, human logic 
doesn’t follow the utility function or the probability theory’s logic [119]. Rather than 
using formal methods or following systematic procedures, people usually make decisions 
by focusing on possible actions in the immediate situation and on the most obvious 
problems [119]. 
The realization that decision makers do not follow the principles of utility theory 
has led to behavioral decision researches, which are concerned about how people process 
information and make judgments. Studies have identified different cognitive and 
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emotional limitations that bind human rationality and produce systematic errors [119]. 
They showed that decision makers do not consider all the alternatives, but instead 
consider only a few and look at them consequentially instead of simultaneously [119, 
130, 146, 147]. 
All of these factors helped in deriving the concept of bounded rationality, which 
was first introduced by Herbert Simon [91, 136, 140]. Simon considered rationality as 
optimization, and decision making as a fully rational process of finding an optimal choice 
given the information available. Since decision makers lack the ability and resources to 
reach the optimal solution, they are partly rational [136]. To overcome this bounded 
rationality, people greatly simplify the choices available and seek a satisfactory solution 
rather than the optimal one, which Simon called ‘Satisficing’. The satisficing strategy 
considered “optimal” if the costs of the decision making process and obtaining complete 
information are considered in calculating the outcome [136]. 
According to Simon [136, 140, 148], people cannot feasibly consider the optimal 
rational decision because of cognitive limitations of humans and structures of the 
environment that act as barriers. One of these cognitive limitations is related to the 
working memory: the human cognitive systems can process, remember, compare and 
recognize up to seven variables - plus or minus two - at the same time [141, 149]. When 
there is more variance, the human cognitive system becomes ignorant about what is going 
to happen. As a consequence, decision makers who try to make rational decisions will be 
constrained by limited cognitive capability and actions may not be completely rational, 
even with the best of intentions and efforts. [139, 148-151].  
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Humans can overcome this limitation by using decision judgment models built to 
fit with the mind’s capacities rather than “fictitious competencies, because of the minds 
limitations, humans must use approximate methods to handle most tasks” [148] page 6. 
These methods exploit pre-existing structure and regularity in the environment [96, 152]. 
The second component of Simon’s view of bounded rationality, the concept 
environmental structure, therefore explains under what conditions simple heuristics 
perform well or when the structure of the heuristic is adapted to the structure of the 
information in the environment [109]. 
2.3.2.3. Heuristics and Bias Theory 
The discovery of bounded rationality has created a stream of research that was 
focused on uncovering human decision approaches and systematic errors. The theory of 
Heuristics and Bias proposed by Tversky and Kaheneman [134] page 1124, demonstrates 
that “people rely on limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex 
tasks of assigning probabilities and predicting values to simple judgment operations. In 
general, these heuristic are quite useful, but sometimes they led to severe and systematic 
errors.”  
Newer research in the field of heuristics is currently challenging this view. 
Heuristics and Bias views human inferences as quick-and-dirty, systematically biased and 
error-prone while probability inferences, that follow the theory of rational decision 
making, are not. This view relies on the laws of probability and statistics as normative, 
though humans cannot stand up to these norms [114, 153]. According to Tversky and 
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Kaheneman [134] page 18, “cognitive bias is not a result of motivation effects, or lack of 
experience: experienced researchers are also prone to the same biases when they think 
intuitively” However, experts do better than a non-expert because they rely on the 
reflective system [154].  
The interpretation of bounded rationality and heuristics and bias represent the use 
of heuristics as making decisions that fly in the face of logic [141], and uses the term 
heuristics to account for “discrepancies between these rational strategies and actual 
human thought processes” [63] page 75. As a result, the view on heuristics has changed 
from indispensable cognitive processes for solving problems that cannot be solved by the 
logic of the probability theory [114], to something that almost opposite in meaning; 
heuristics refer to an unreliable method for make decisions. 
2.3.3  Recent Research on Heuristics:‎“Fast‎and‎Frugal”‎Decisions 
Gigerenzer [89, 114] argues that most decision research has not really followed 
Simon's ideas about bounded rationality by assuming that any simplified decision 
strategy that differs from the idea of rational decision making must deliver poor results. 
Consequently they have researched either how decisions are sub-optimal because of 
limitations of human rationality, or they have constructed elaborate optimizing models of 
how people might cope with their inability to optimize [98, 149, 155, 156]. In addition, 
the second component of bounded rationality, the environmental structure, explains that 
heuristics can perform well when the structure of the heuristic is adapted to the structure 
of the information in the environment. In these cases the heuristic can deliver good 
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decision results while preserving scarce cognitive resources [157, 158]. The new call was 
to bring the environmental structure back into the study of heuristic decision, thus, a new 
focus on ecological rationality was born [109].  
To adapt to the changing environment, decision makers have to make fast, frugal 
and good enough decisions. These real-world requirements lead to a new conception that 
proper reasoning must be ecologically rational” [109] page465. Ecological rationality 
exploits structures of information in the environment, and uses the right strategy to 
analyze this information and make a decision [114, 159]. The simplicity of heuristics 
make them well adapted to environmental change and can be generalized for new 
situations; such adaption will take advantage of the information available and fit with the 
new situation [103]. 
More recent research on heuristics attempts to investigate how heuristics evolve 
in response to specific decision environments, what types of heuristics exist and how they 
perform. To demonstrate the breadth of recent research that is interested in studying 
cognitive decision making heuristics, a taxonomy that categorizes and summarizes 
researches depending on their approaches has been developed (review Appendix A). In 
the next pages we review structured heuristics and their performance in artificial and real- 
life decision environment. 
Recent research in psychology challenges the heuristics and bias view, and re-
discovered heuristic decision making, and particularly so-called “Fast and Frugal” (F&F) 
heuristics, as a means to reach “good enough” decisions in complex situations that are 
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characterized by multiple decision criteria, high uncertainty and time pressure [89]. This 
view has influenced popular business literature and has led to bestselling books on the 
value of managerial intuition [92, 96]. 
2.3.3.1. Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
Fast and frugal heuristic characterize a set of ecologically rational rules of thumbs 
that allow decision makers to operate effectively in environments in which time, 
knowledge and computational tools are limited [114]. They are simple heuristics that 
researchers classify and structure into steps or rules. This research is concern about these 
structure heuristics that can be modeled, thus from now on the use of we are referring to 
fast and frugal heuristic. There are three general rules or building blocks for fast and 
frugal heuristics that comprise the principles by which the heuristics organizes the search 
for a solutions among a given set of alternatives and makes a decision [109]. These rules 
are :the search rule, the stopping rule, and the decision rule [92]. 
The search rule determines how decision criteria are applied to search for 
alternatives. The search will compare alternative with regard to important criteria until 
significant difference between the alternatives is found. When a significant difference is 
found the search stops, and the alternative that fulfills the stop condition is be chosen 
[109, 114]. 
The stopping rule determines when and how the search procedure should be 
stopped. Heuristic examination is limited rather than exhaustive. They do not study all 
available information, but instead they just take slices of the information important 
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enough to help making the decisions [92, 96]. This limited examination makes heuristics 
different from the applications of utility theory. Utility theory applications have no 
stopping rules and integrate all pieces of information into the final decision, whereas 
heuristics keep decision makers from integrating multiple pieces of information [89, 95, 
97, 105]. 
The decision rule determines how the search results -from research and stop rules 
- are translated into the actual decision. Decision rules are typically simple and require 
little additional information processing beyond the information obtained through the 
search. The clear stop rules, decrease the time used to make a decision [110, 160]. 
Fast and Frugal heuristics exploit structures of information in the environment 
[114] and thus allow decision makers to operate effectively without mathematical 
decision aids when there are high levels of uncertainty and limited time [89]. They can, 
however, be computationally modeled for evaluation and training purpose [89, 102]. 
These characteristics of fast and frugal heuristics that differentiate them from other 
decision models are summarized in Table ‎2.8 
Table ‎2.8 Main Characteristics of Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
Founded in evolved psychological capacities such as memory and the perceptual 
system  
Ecologically rational; exploit structures of information in the environment 
Simple enough to operate effectively when time, knowledge, and computational are 
limited 
Precise enough to be modeled computationally  
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Powerful enough to model both good and poor reasoning  
Gigerenzer, Goldstein, and others focus their attention on identifying the fast and 
frugal decision making heuristics by proposing computational models for heuristics, 
analyzing the environmental structure and testing their efficiency and effectiveness in 
various decision situations [89, 92-94, 103, 104, 111, 114, 121]. These studies often 
include a pre-defined set of heuristics, and assess which of these heuristics is the best 
predictor of subject’s actual choices [107, 161-163]. They have identified two classes of 
F&F heuristics and many specific heuristics, which will be described in the following 
section. 
2.3.3.2. Different Classes of Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
Research has identified two broad classes of F&F heuristics; those that use a 
single reason, and those that consider multiple reasons at the same time. 
A number of psychological experiments suggest that people often base their 
intuitive judgment on a single good reason [164]. Single, reason heuristics, also called 
lexicographic heuristics, describe comparative preferences where a decision 
maker infinitely prefers one option X to another Y. This class of heuristics based the 
judgment on the most important criterion that most validly predict judgments about 
alternatives and are applicable when the criteria do not share the same level of priority 
[89]. Lexicographic heuristics order the criteria in descending order from the most 
important criterion to the least and then select the alternative with the best value on 
highest priority criterion. In the case of a tie between two alternatives under the most 
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important criterion, decision makers search the tied alternatives again according to the 
next important criterion, and go in the same order until finding a difference between the 
alternatives until decision makers can then choose a single alternative. Decision makers 
may still have to test most of the available criteria before they can find the distinguishing 
attribute that leads to a final decision. Variants of this lexicographic heuristics exist in the 
form of the, the Take-the- Best heuristic and Priority heuristic [94, 114]. 
Take-the- Best algorithm (TTB) depends on the rule of thumb that humans apply 
in daily life; this technique suggests, ‘Try to Take-the- Best and ignore the rest.’ Take-
the- Best model is a non-compensatory strategy based on a single reason, and uses 
recognition heuristics to make rapid inferences about unknown aspects. The simple idea 
of this heuristic model is to treat what you know as important, ignore what you do not 
know. Starting by testing most important criteria, once you find a differentiation between 
the alternative (if one alternative provides the criteria and the others do not or you do not 
have enough information if alternatives meet the criteria or not) stop testing and pick the 
alternative that satisfies your criteria [59, 89].  
The priority heuristic follows a simple rule where the decision maker has four 
reasons: the maximum gain, the minimum gain, and their respective probabilities. Criteria 
ranked from the most important, and search stops after finding a single distinguishing 
reason between the alternative but takes into account when criteria are interdependent and 
in conflict, e.g., when the criterion of high profits is in conflict with the criterion of low 
risk, decision makers order the criteria depending on the priority of the criteria in the 
given domain and the environment. One of the suggested ordering rule for these situation 
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is to start with the minimum gain (and minimum risk), then probability of minimum gain, 
then maximum gain, because the reason for focusing on the minimum outcome is to 
avoid the worst outcome [94]. 
The search will stop immediately after first discriminating criterion is found. 
Following the concept of satisficing search can stop when an alternative surpasses an 
aspiration level. Where aspiration level is a fixed (not free) value, the decision maker will 
choose in order to stop the search if the alternative value meets or exceeds [155].  
Elimination-by-Aspect (EBA) model proposed by Tversky [165], use the concepts 
of simple training, decision processes and a small memory load from psychological 
models. It is used to screen a group of alternatives quickly by eliminating those that do 
not match the requirements. Using this heuristic, after ordering the criteria according to 
importance, decision makers select and establish a cutoff value for each criterion. Then 
they start the screening by eliminating the alternatives that do not satisfy the value of the 
most important criterion. The heuristic then continues testing the alternatives according to 
the criteria that are left in their order of priority and eliminates those that do not meet the 
value of each criterion until only one alternative remains [93, 94, 108]. 
Another well-known heuristic is ‘Categorization-by-Elimination.’ Categorization 
requires determination of category membership of the alternative using the limited 
information provided about the future to make decision about this choice [166]. Many 
different models of categorization have been proposed in the literature [108, 166, 167]. 
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Categorizing instances into clusters depends on the probability that an instance has 
certain features that allow it to be a member of a particular category [166].  
Another class of heuristics is based on cumulative data instead of a single reason. 
Thus, it compiles the values of all or most of the criteria, in a simple way, to make a 
judgment. The Tallying heuristic, for example, gives all or some of the attributes the 
same level of priority and chooses the alternative that is supported by most reasons [114]. 
It disregards the relative importance of arguments and orders them randomly. To make a 
decision, decision makers compute the score of each option by adding up the number of 
its pros and then subtracting the number of its cons. The option with the highest score 
wins [93, 114]. 
While the Tallying heuristic does not take into account the relative importance of 
the criteria, Bivariate and Level-wise Tallying take into account that some criteria are 
more important than others and rank criteria in levels with regard to their importance. 
Then, alternatives would be tested with regard to criteria going from top to down, while 
computing the score for ach alternative by adding up the number of its pro’s (at this level) 
and then subtracting the number of its con’s (at the same level), until a difference level is 
reached. The preferred alternative is the one that presents the higher net score [102, 168]. 
2.3.3.3. Applications of Simple Heuristics 
In the last ten years, many studies came out to test the efficiency of using 
heuristics in decision making. These studies tested these models’ results mathematically 
and compared them with compensatory mathematical decision models. 
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Two different research designs exist: the first group compares the results of using 
simple heuristics in solving real problems, against well-known decision models in the 
field or against mathematical regression models as standard models free from biases [63, 
88, 95, 101, 106, 112, 113, 148]. The second group tests the validity of the heuristics in 
laboratory tests [63, 64, 89, 107]. 
For the first group, in the medical field, studies took place to support diagnostic 
decisions. Katsikopoulos and Fasolo [95, 164], and Smith and Gilhooly [63] used the fast 
and frugal concept to develop a simple multi-attribute models and Yes/No decision trees 
to help caregivers diagnose medical problems and prescribe the right medication. Their 
models and decision-trees have been tested on simulated data, as well as on real cases. 
Katsikopoulos and Fasolo’s F&F model registered performance accuracy in 72 percent of 
the cases; the logistic regression system achieved 75 percent accuracy, but took a longer 
time [164]. Smith and Gilhooly [63] found that the fast decision model which depends on 
matching heuristics, achieved almost as good results as the logistic regression model, but 
was faster and more flexible in making decisions about what medication should be 
prescribe for depression. 
Outside the medical field, several studies tested heuristics models in forecasting 
outcomes [84, 85, 101, 106, 112, 113]. One of these studies tested the simple heuristics in 
comparison with the performance and information process strategies of experts and non- 
experts when predicting results in the 2002 World Cup soccer tournament [106]. From 
this experiment, that included 250 participants with different levels of knowledge, they 
concluded that participants who obtained more information about the teams did not 
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outperform those who had no such information; this suggests that we need just a slice of 
information and not all of it to make a good prediction [106]. 
Bradley [101] used F&F decision models for early warning in order to forecast 
conflict escalation. Rather than drawing on dozens of indicators like the majority of early 
warning systems, which necessitates access to substantial amounts of data, most of which 
is highly aggregated and/or of poor quality, he used just three indicators. He used the 
results from this ‘good enough’ model to argue that both the conflict early warning and 
intelligence communities should consider the value of fast and frugal analysis. 
Astebro and Elhedhli [112] tested the success of simple heuristics in forecasting 
commercial success of new entrepreneur projects. They tracked the success of 561 
projects that had been evaluated in their early-stages by experts from the Canadian 
Invention Assessment Program (IAP); they found that the simple decision heuristics used 
to forecast projects succeeded in predicting 86 percent of the projects correctly. Experts 
predicted 82.6 percent correctly, while a log linear regression model correctly predicted 
78.6 percent of the projects.  
Albar et al. [132] modeled three commonly discussed Fast and frugal (F&F) 
heuristics for project screening (Take-the-Best, Tallying, and Elimination-by-Aspect) and 
employed a decision experiment to explore their performance as a means to clear the 
front end of product development of unwanted ideas. They found that the performance of 
simple heuristics may be better than commonly assumed: Two out of the three F&F 
heuristics reach accuracies of over 80% for project selection and 70% for project 
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rejection and the best F&F model, Tallying, performs similarly to the best regression 
model. 
Gigerenzer and his research group [89, 92, 93, 103, 104, 114] have analyzed the 
quality of the Take-the- Best (TTB) heuristic, one of the lexicographic heuristics 
introduced in the prior section, by asking which of two cities has a larger population. 
They tested the algorithm through simulation and compared the results to other 
algorithms that integrate all information and are considered to be rational, such as 
weighted tallying, which weighs and combines all alternatives, and a regression model. 
They found that the TTB algorithm drew as many correct inferences as the integration 
models, including the regression model, and performed substantially better than linear 
models. Gigerenzer tested TTB again, but instead of predicting the population of a city, 
he used it to predict the smallest dropout rate in a comparison of 57 high schools in 
Chicago, Illinois, based on 18 attributes [92]. From these two experiments, the simple 
heuristic of ‘one good reason’ proved better and generated faster results than evaluating 
all reasons in predicting what we do not know. On average, the TTB algorithm tested 
three attributes before it stopped searching and picked a choice which researchers found 
to be an acceptable choice. TTB performed on average as well as the regression models 
and used less time [89, 92]. 
Little experimental work has examined the validity of using Tallying [93]; some 
experiments examine the accuracy of the tallying heuristic by getting the average number 
of answers it correctly predicted and suggests that level-wise Tallying has (by far) the 
greatest descriptive validity, with an overall accuracy of seventy seven percent [168]. 
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Gigerenzer explains the reason behind the efficiency of using simple heuristics as 
follows: “In uncertainty, a complex strategy can fail because it explains too much in 
hindsight. Only part of the information is valuable for the future, and the art of intuition is 
to focus on that part and ignore the rest. A simple rule that relies only on the best clue has 
a good chance of hitting on that useful piece of information” [92] page 85. 
Some psychological research argues that not everyone follows the simple 
heuristics that fast and frugal models are based on [98-100, 110, 155]. For example, in an 
experimental setting Newell et al. [98] found that some people seek further information 
(and even pay for it), even after they find the distinguishing attribute. Their experiments 
show that 33 percent of the participants strictly follow the TTB heuristics, 46- 62 percent 
use some other frugal heuristics, and 25-38 percent violate the TTB fast and frugal 
heuristics. What works to make quick and accurate inferences with some people may not 
be the same with others, and what may work in one domain, may not work in another. 
Different environments can have different specific heuristics that exploit their particular 
information structure to make good decisions fitting with their situation [99, 155]. 
2.3.4  Summary and Discussion- Heuristics from Bounded Rationality to 
Ecological Rationality  
Even though heuristics can lead to deviations from optimal decisions, recent 
psychological, social, and managerial decision research is increasingly interested in 
decision makers’ use of heuristics because heuristics result in accuracies close to more 
complex decision rules and seem particularly useful in difficult decision making contexts, 
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especially when there is uncertainty over the future or when the decision need to be 
quickly made [63, 64, 89, 95, 107, 164]. Simple decision heuristics are therefore 
potentially useful for many kinds of managerial decisions and in particular for early 
project screening in the FFE, where the gathering of information for a full-blown multi-
criteria decision model could result in long time delays and high costs, and decision 
errors are ‘cheap’ because they will soon be caught at subsequent checkpoints. 
It is likely that managers use simple heuristics for project screening, which is 
frequently described as non-analytical, intuitive, and reliant on gut-feeling [20, 25, 40]. 
Since managerial heuristics evolve over time as a result of latent learning, at least some 
of these heuristics have to be well adapted to the decision environment presented in the 
FFE and useful at striking the right balance between decision costs and time on the one 
hand and decision quality on the other hand. If these successful heuristics could be 
identified, captured and computationally modeled, we may be able to develop decision 
aids for the FFE that overcome many of the challenges identified in Chapter 2.  
Currently it is impossible to achieve this objective, because the heuristics expert 





2.4 Literature Gaps 
This extensive review of the literature was conducted on three major related areas: 
firstly, new product development emphasizing on the fuzzy front end (Chapter 2.1), 
secondly, decision making approaches used for project screening (Chapter 2.3), and 
thirdly, heuristics decision (Chapter 2.3). A summary of the literature, as well as the 
currently existing gaps are identified in Table ‎2.9 
For the fuzzy front end of new product development, current research simply 
states that screening is known to have an impact on project success; decisions are made 
informally, based on intuition. However, it is unknown when and how these decision are 
made, which criteria are used and which principles these informal decisions follow. 
Although researchers suggested some analytical methods for project screening, there was 
no evaluation system to evaluate the performance of decision making tools under 
different situations. This literature review grouped the most important features of FFE 
and used them to assist the decision methods, and close this gab. This evaluation found 
that the analytical decision methods in the study are not suitable for the FFE. Thus, the 
FFE needs systematic, transparent and efficient techniques for screening project concepts 
to make Go/No- Go decision as part of a series of evaluations or check points.  
The alternative approach to screen new products at the FFE is the decision 
heuristics where researches show that managerial heuristics play an important role in 
early project screening. However, it is unclear how intuitive screening decisions are 
made, because there is little research about decision heuristics, and even less is known 
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about how managers and experts use heuristics in project selection? Which heuristics are 
in use? Or, how they are used? This project is aiming to address this gab and investigate 
the managerial heuristics in screening new products at the FFE. 
Table ‎2.9 Summary of Existing Literature and Gap Analysis 
Topic Emphasis on Existing Literature Gaps in the literature 
New Product 
Development 
New Product Development as a 
mostly non-linear process that 
requires project evaluations at 
multiple stages 
Improve knowledge 
about the screening 
process in the early 
stages of NPD  
Fuzzy Front End  Fuzzy Front End has unique 
characteristics and requirements that 
distinguish it from other project 
stages. Because of the difficulties 
involved in evaluating projects in an 
early stage, managers heavily rely on 
non-analytical techniques. Decisions 
are therefore individual and 
undocumented and cannot be 
analyzed for improvement 
Improved methods for 
early project screening 
that fit the 
characteristics and 





A variety of formal decision making 
approaches to evaluate new projects 
being proposed, though rarely 
evaluated against other methods or 
in real-world setting 
Evaluation of the 
effectiveness of current 
projects screening 
methods for the 
purpose of FFE 
Heuristics  Different heuristics are identified and 
modeled 
Elicitation of heuristics 
that mangers use for 
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In some situations, heuristics lead to 
good decisions despite a lack of time, 
information, and computational 
power 
  
early project screening  
Modeling of 
managerial heuristics 
for early project 
screening  
Evaluation of the 
quality of managerial 
heuristics models in 
early project screening  
2.5 Conclusion 
The above review of the literature and existing gaps made it clear that managers 
in the FFE usually face a situation where they have many proposed projects, limited 
budgets, and limited time to study the incoming proposals. A number of decision-
theoretical models for project evaluation are proposed in the literature; however, their 
great contribution has been in the downstream end of the development process where 
data is available to feed complex decision models. Furthermore, these models have been 
underutilized as tools because they require data that new product development cannot 
practically provide [52, 58, 169, 170].  
Currently, academic research fails to provide formal project screening models that 
fit the needs of the FFE. Instead, many front end decisions are based on managerial 
intuition, rather than analytical approaches. However, to date, little is known about the 
product screening heuristics managers use, which and how many decision criteria they 
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employ, and if and to what extend their decision process resembles the ‘fast and frugal’ 
heuristics identified in recent psychological research.  
After studying three areas trying to answer nine questions to identify the best 
suitable decisions tool to screen projects the FFE addressed in the literature, this chapter 
identified six gaps in the literature need to be addressed (Figure ‎2.3). 
  
Figure ‎2.3 Summary of Literature Review and Gap Analysis 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH OBJECTIVE, GAPS AND APPROACH 
3.1 Research Problem  
Managerial heuristics provide a quick and inexpensive way to clear the product 
screening system of unwanted ideas before they eat up resources for front end evaluation. 
However, managerial heuristics used for project screening are largely unknown. To date, 
little is known about the product screening heuristics managers’ use, which and how 
many decision criteria they employ, and to what extent their decision process resembles 
the fast and frugal heuristics identified in recent psychological research. 
3.2 Research Gaps, Goals and Questions  
The objective of this dissertation is to advance existing knowledge toward a more 
complete understanding of expert judgment behavior related to screening projects at the 
FFE of NPD. Researcher is aiming to examining the way in which decision are made by 
highly proficient managers in screen projects at the FFE, and integrate these data to 
develop a heuristic decision model.  
Four sets of research questions have been posed to achieve two goals: discover 
heuristics decision makers’ use for FFE project screening, and structure the observed 
heuristics into systematic models (summarized in Table ‎3.1). 
The four research questions are: 
RQ1. What are the main objectives and constraints for FFE project screening? 
(Context of heuristics). 
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RQ2. What are the criteria used in the evaluation process? How are they ranked or 
weighted? How are they used to discern alternatives? (Structure of heuristics) 
RQ3. Which patterns are observed to occur? (Patterns of use) 
RQ4. How might a model be constructed from illustrated knowledge? (Mode 
heuristics) 
Table ‎3.1 Research Goals and Questions 
Research Gaps Research Goals Research Questions 
Gap: Elicitation of 
heuristics that mangers 
use for early project 
screening  
G1. Discover decision 
makers' heuristics for FFE 
project screening 
RQ1: What are the main 
objectives and constraints 
for FFE project screening? 
(Context of heuristics) 
RQ2: What are the criteria 
used in the evaluation 
process? How are they 
ranked or weighted? How 
are they used to discern 
alternatives? (Structure of 
the heuristics) 
RQ3: Are similar heuristics 
used by different 




Gap: Modeling of 
managerial heuristics for 
early project screening  
G2: Structure the 
observed heuristics in 
systematic models  
RQ4 How can the 
identified heuristics be 
modeled? (Model 
heuristics) 
By answering these questions, this research contributes in closing the research 
gap. It aims to identify the new product screening heuristics used in the FFE, and 
integrate a project screening model for the FFE. Eliciting and modeling the heuristics 
they use is an important area of research that will enable future researchers in 
management science and knowledge engineering to evaluate the current practices, 
identify the most successful ones, and emulate them in decision aids, expert systems and 
training programs [15, 66, 171, 172]. 
Since no theories exist to explain or predict the use of heuristics in the front end, 
the research follows an inductive design. However, the purpose of this research is not to 
develop a new theory, but to enable such theory development by providing a formal 
description of the screening heuristics expert managers use for the FFE. The same 
research objectives -the description of problem solving heuristics through formal models 
are at the core of the field of knowledge engineering. 
Knowledge engineering captures and models expert knowledge in order to make 
it accessible through knowledge-based systems and building expert systems [14]. 
Knowledge engineering offers a variety of approaches for expert identification, 
knowledge elicitation, and knowledge modeling [14, 16, 171, 173]. These approaches are 






CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The primary focus of this research is to elucidate thorough descriptions of 
managerial heuristics. This can be achieved through a variety of methods evolved in 
knowledge engineering and cognitive science which have allowed investigators to 
discover the process and means of knowledge. These methods include observation, 
simulation, physiological, neuroscience, and experimental methods [174-177]. 
This research follows an inductive approach, rather than attempting to identify a 
predefined set of theoretically derived heuristics. It therefore applies Cognitive Task 
Analysis (CTA), which is a core method of knowledge engineering [14, 178, 179].  
CTA is used to look into the black box of cognitive processes, and describe these 
processes formally through mathematical models [180]. CTA helps make expert 
knowledge accessible for designing practical aids, such as expert systems, decision 
support tools, and training manuals [14, 171, 173, 181]. CTA provides an extension of 
traditional task analysis techniques to yield information about the knowledge [182, 183]. 
A variety of CTA approaches have been used for knowledge elicitation, data 
analysis, and knowledge modeling, while ensuring the reliability and validity of research 
findings [14, 16, 171, 173]. CTA methods have been used for studying and describing the 
reasoning, knowledge, and strategies required for task performance in real world contexts 
[184-186]. The outcome of CTA methods is a description of conceptual or procedural 
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knowledge, performance, objectives or standards experts use when performing tasks 
[177, 179] 
CTA offers a variety of methods that can be grouped under three primary 
categories: 1) knowledge elicitation, 2) data analysis, and 3) knowledge representation. 
Although many people associate CTA with knowledge elicitation, which has received the 
bulk of attention, each of these three aspects is critical for successful cognitive research 
[15, 177, 184, 187, 188].  
The interest in cognitive task analysis has increased rapidly in the last decade. 
CTA has been used in hundreds of research studies that require cognitive understanding, 
such as developing expert systems [189-191], and medical research [192-198]. System 
analysis uses CTA for identifying user requirements in system design, trainers and 
instructional system designers apply CTA methods to describe cognitive process and 
specify training requirements [183, 199]. Market researches use CTA to expose consumer 
decision processes and product use [184, 200]. Program managers, whether building new 
technology or improving an old one, look at the CTA as tools for understanding the 
cognitive requirement of operators on both individual and team levels [186, 201, 202]. 
Many researchers have studied the quality and the value of CTA tools [182, 192, 
203, 204]. According to Lee [204], there are 318 published studies, in ten major academic 
databases, that used CTA between 1985 and 2003. CTA provides researchers with a 
strong pool of techniques to study cognitive judging. After studying the group of CTA 
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methods, we chose the methods that would help address the four research questions. The 
rest of this chapter discusses these methods. 
4.2 Methodological Choices 
The methodological choices were made in pursuit of the research objectives. Three 
groups of methods are needed in order to answer research questions; 1) methods to 
identify experts; 2) methods to elicit expert knowledge; and 3) methods to analyze 
collected data and present results. 
4.2.1  Identifying Experts 
CTA typically focuses on capturing expert knowledge. Research should therefore 
collect information on the individual level from people who are subject matter experts 
(SME). Although true experts are scarce [138], they are also very knowledgeable, and 
therefore capable of uncovering a large number of problem aspects during interviews 
[184]. An expert is defined as a person with a very high level of proficiency and 
capability to make judgment decisions and discriminations that are difficult for most 
other people [171, 175, 184]. Experts have developed their skills through practice in their 
area of specialties and their performance and achievement have been tested again and 
again, which results in a unique skill set: As an example, senior managers are more 
knowledgeable with respect to strategic options [205], while middle managers have a 
more accurate and realistic view of the organization’s available resources [206] and 
technological possibilities [207]. 
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Because expertise is a result of practice, it is determined by the amount of time a 
person has spent doing a particular job [96, 171, 208]. The rule of thumb for selecting 
SME, based on Simon’s 1973 studies on chess game players, states that expertise can be 
achieved after 10,000 hours of practicing (about 4 years). However, an expert typically 
does not only work on activities that directly relate to his expertise and may therefore 
need more time on the job to accumulate sufficient practice hours. Klein et al. [171] 
therefore state that 10 years on the job is sufficient time to achieve expertise, while other 
researches [14, 187], found that people can earn 25,000 hours of experience while they 
are still in their early thirties and thus much faster. Moreover, the work environment 
determines how much knowledge is accumulated. Klein et al. [22] in their research on 
firefighters observed that ten years of rural firefighting was not as valuable for skill 
development as a year or two of the same work in the inner city because urban 
firefighters are exposed to a wider variety of fires and higher rate of incident, hence 
giving the urban firefighter more experience in a shorter period of time.  
Even though some minimum amount of time is necessary to develop foundational 
knowledge and skills, the actual accumulation of a set of experiences should also be 
taken into consideration. To identify experts, researchers therefore suggest setting a 
proficiency scale based on at least two criteria, one of which is typically experience on 
the job [187].  
For the purpose of this research, four scales will be used to identify experts, 
namely: 1) minimum experience time limits of ten years or more [14-16, 42, 209], 2) 
minimum professional standards, such as degree requirements or licensing, relevant for 
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the group of practitioners the experts belong to [210, 211], 3) measures of performance, 
such as the position of the experts or their recognition in their respective fields [14], 4) 
social interaction analysis; where peers with the same career recommend this person as 
an expert in the area [14-16, 209].  
4.2.2  Number of Respondents and Cases 
Because experts are scarce and expensive, most CTA studies rely on a very small 
number of respondents – as little as 2 to 3 [192, 212, 213] and no clear rules exist as to 
how many experts to include and how many cases to discuss with them. (Taxonomy of 
research using CTA methods with a number of participants is enclosed in Appendix B).  
In inductive social science research, there also are no clear rules on the number of 
participants and cases needed to have sufficient data [214, 215]. The general rule on 
sample size for interview research is: when similar stories, themes, issues, and topics are 
emerging from the interviewees, a sufficient sample size has been reached [216]. 
Eisenhardt [215] argues that it is often difficult to generate theory or build a cognitive 
model, with much complexity, based on four cases or less, unless these cases have 
several mini sub-cases within them. On the other hand, the same research advises that 
with more than 10 cases, it often becomes difficult to manage the complexity and volume 
of the data [215]. Guest’s study [217] that involved 60 interviews found that theme 
saturation was achieved after 12 interviews. Based on these findings, this research will 
conduct more than 4 interviews with several cases embedded in each interview and will 
continue to add respondents for as long as new insights emerge.  
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4.2.3  Knowledge Elicitation Methods 
It is not enough to identify the right expert to carry out a thorough and valid 
cognitive research. One of the hardest aspects involved in cognitive research is eliciting 
experts’ knowledge and skills. This is related to the fact that whenever a skill or 
knowledge has been highly practiced, it becomes tacit. As experts learn and practice their 
knowledge, they lose awareness of what they know and how to share this knowledge 
[218, 219]. Experts perform tasks without being aware of how or why they do what they 
do [220]. This type of knowledge needs effective knowledge elicitation methods in order 
to be extracted.  
Knowledge elicitation methods are a set of methods used to obtain information 
about the knowledge, strategies, and judgments that experts use and the way they use 
them. They lead to knowledge models that show the contents of an expert's knowledge 
and how these contents operate. These knowledge models include facts, concepts, 
principles, and events that occur within the domain [184].  
Knowledge elicitation is the first step of cognitive task analysis. Cooke [188] 
identifies three broad families of knowledge elicitation techniques under the CTA 
umbrella: (a) observation and interviews, (b) process tracing, and (c) conceptual 
techniques. Observations and interviews involve face to face meetings with experts where 
in-depth discussions take place, as well as observation of the participants while they 
perform the task under study [176, 177, 184, 221]. Process tracing techniques collect data 
about an expert’s performance of a specific task either through think-aloud protocol or 
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verbal self-report [222, 223]. Conceptual techniques produce structured representations 
of concepts within its domain [177] which been used for knowledge modeling or Concept 
mapping. Research conducted by Wei and Salvendy [224] introduces a fourth family of 
formal models, which use simulations to model tasks in the cognitive domain like using 
simulated games or situation to test cognitive behavior and reaction. 
Within these sets, conducting interviews is the most frequently implemented 
method of knowledge elicitation [214, 215, 225-232].  
An interview is an efficient method that is less complicated than making 
observations. Data collected through interviews is usually valuable and rich because it 
can capture information that is easily missed by other methods [216]. Another alternative 
method is one of the process tracing techniques, thinking aloud, which requires experts to 
report on their thinking processes during or after a task had been performed, by using 
personal report or thinking aloud while performing the task [175]. These two methods are 
described in detail in the following sections. 
4.2.3.1. Interview 
The three main styles of interview methods are structured, unstructured, and semi- 
structured. Structured interviewing has fixed content and sequencing. A semi-structured 
interview format is more flexible and allows the interviewer to switch to relevant issues 
as the dialogue progresses, whereas an unstructured interview is free-flowing [171, 172, 
221, 226].  
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The typical approach for investigating behaviors is the semi structured, in-depth 
face to face interview, where the interview guide focuses on cases or incidents and 
highlights important factors and decision processes [221]. This dialogical technique has 
been widely applied in knowledge engineering and is called the Critical Decision Method 
(CDM) [14, 15, 171, 215, 226]. CDM is defined as “a retrospective interview strategy 
that applies a set of cognitive probes to actual non-routine incidents that required expert 
judgment or decision making” [171] Page 1. CDM has been used to examine non-routine 
and challenging events because stories and incidents provide great potential to uncover 
elements of expertise related to cognitive phenomena [184] 
CDM is an interview-based method that uses open-ended questions to motivate 
respondents to remember specific decision situations, describe these situations, discuss 
their judgment process, and decision making strategies. 
 The interview guideline may additionally apply a set of probes to encourage the 
expert to explicitly discuss his or her judgment process and reflect on his or her own 
system of decision making strategies [171, 172, 226, 227]. 
 CDM makes use of the fact that experts often refer to illustrative or prototypical 
examples of past cases when asked to justify or explain their decisions or actions. They 
like to ‘tell stories’ because a great deal of an expert’s knowledge is remembered in the 
form of previously encountered cases [233]. In CDM interviews, experts are prompted to 
retrieve past events from memory, for example by asking the interviewee to select the last 
situation where she or he has had to make a decision of interest to the researcher. If the 
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participant cannot immediately remember a decision making incident, then several 
scenarios are briefly proposed to encourage the participant to pick the most relevant one 
and start discussing the situation and his or her decision making process [171-173, 215, 
221, 225]. For many people, drawing a diagram is necessary to refresh their memory and 
help in reconstructing the key features of a situation [171, 172]. Therefore, participants 
are allowed to draw diagrams while explaining the process or in responding to probes. In 
addition, participants are encouraged to share any personal notes, documents, or journals 
they have been using in their decision making process. 
 In most knowledge elicitation projects, researchers rarely have two hours with a 
domain expert, and in some situations do not have more than fifteen minutes to conduct 
their interviews [171, 172]. For practical purposes, the inquiry is therefore considered 
complete when the interviewee tells his own story and point of view, and gives as many 
different perspectives as possible, which are often presented in stories, examples, 
conversations, metaphors, and analogies [231, 234]. 
The use of retrospective protocols of stories and incidents allows research on 
naturalistic tasks that cannot be emulated in experiments and avoids any influence of the 
researcher on the respondent’s actual decision process. It is furthermore suitable for the 
examination of non-routine events that cannot be easily observed in the field because 
they occur in an ad-hoc way [15, 171, 172, 178, 226, 235, 236]. To avoids the risk of 
recall biases that could cause respondents to forget some past decisions or to remember 
decisions as more structured than they actually were, a second methodology will be 
applied to collect data. Process tracing approach allows observing participants while they 
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are performing a task, witness and describes behavior in a work context and unveils a 
greater amount of specific (task-related) information than interviews as discussed in the 
following section. It does, however, require that the researchers know when the task will 
be performed and thus cannot capture ad-hoc situations. It therefore often relies on 
specifically prepared ‘test cases’ that can create an artificial evaluation situation. To 
offset the disadvantages of each method and minimize method biases, we applied both 
CTA approaches. 
4.2.3.2. Thinking aloud procedure 
Protocol tracing provides a viable alternative technique to the interview, for 
knowledge elicitation. Thinking aloud is a commonly used method that has been widely 
accepted as a useful foundation for cognitive research [172, 222, 237]. During the 
thinking aloud procedure, participants are asked to actually perform the task and screen 
project proposals while describing the steps required, or essentially to think aloud. The 
task performance may actually be a real-world task or a set of specifically prepared test 
cases that reflect the scope of activities the researchers are interested in. The latter 
approach has been successfully employed by developers of expert systems to elicit 
experts’ knowledge [238, 239]. 
The advantage of this process tracing technique is being able to witness and 
describe the participant’s expert behavior while performing the task in a work context 
and potentially gathering the verbalization of cognitive activities, which generate a 
greater amount of specific information than the interview [226]. However, in the case like 
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FFE where decision take place ad-hoc, no predicting for the time or place the task will 
take place; this method often relies on specifically prepared ‘test cases’ that can create an 
artificial evaluation situation. 
For quality control research, Crandall et al. [178] suggest to compare the notes of 
the researcher’s team members if there is more than one researcher, or audio recording 
and transcribing the interviewers and observations of participants while they think aloud. 
4.2.4  Data Analysis Methods 
Once expert data is elicited, it needs to be analyzed and synthesized into 
knowledge models. Methods for analyzing and representing CTA data, however, have not 
received the same level of attention as those for knowledge elicitation [178]. Three 
commonly used data analysis methods in CTA are: Work Domain Analysis (WDA), 
which results in the functional description of a work system, Cognitive Mapping, which 
results in a visual map that shows key concepts of a knowledge domain and their 
connections, and the Critical Decision Method (CDM) [14, 177-179]. 
Work Domain Analysis (WDA) builds a representation of an entire work domain. 
It performs a functional analysis of a work domain to build a representation of the entire 
work in terms of levels of abstractions, with each level being a distractive type of 
constraint. This information is represented in an abstraction decomposition matrix. The 
matrix captures information elicited from experts regarding their goals and reasoning, and 
then combines them into a bigger context to represent the collaboration between all 
entities and organizational goals. A WDA matrix shows the relationships between entries 
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on the same level and those on higher and lower levels and how functions and needs 
meet. WDA has most frequently been used to describe the structure of human machine 
systems for process control, but it is now finding interest in the fields of analysis and 
design of complex systems [14]. Thus, it is not suitable for the purpose of this research 
about illustrating the decision heuristics from collected data. 
Concept mapping is a very strong tool that been widely used for knowledge 
modeling of domain concepts and to represent the relationships among concepts using 
diagrams, called concept maps. Concept maps are diagrams that are used to represent and 
convey knowledge. These Concept maps can be linked together to perform a knowledge 
model. Knowledge models are repositories of experts’ knowledge that can be used for 
training purposes, sharing organization knowledge, and also provide infrastructure for 
project management. and for any other application [14, 178]. Although can be used to 
analyze incident selection, Concept mapping is concern about the elements in the domain 
and how to connect these elements together in the domain stature, Thus, it does not fit 
with the purpose of this research of analyzing individual cognitive behavior. 
Critical Decision Model (CDM) is also used as analysis technique constructed 
around participants stories. From these stories researchers can extract information about 
attributes, rules of thumb that participants have used, types of decisions they have made, 
and their decision behavior. In order to understand the decision requirements and 
scenarios, the process of coding data must take place. This process of data coding related 
to CDM method is called Protocol Analysis [178]. During the analysis process, each and 
every statement is coded according to some sort of coding sequence or scheme that 
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reflects the goal of the research [171, 174]. Codes are defined as “tags or labels for 
assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a 
study” [240] (Page 56). Since this research is concern about individual judgment and 
collect data for knowledge elicitation is relying on telling stories, CDM along with 
protocol analysis is a suitable analysis method for this research.  
4.2.4.1. Process Analysis and Data Coding  
Coding interviews and extracting contextual information is a lengthy and involved 
phase of analysis [178]. In traditional protocol analysis, each and every statement is 
coded according to some kind of coding scheme that reflects the goal of the research. 
There are a number of alternative coding schemes can be used for protocol analysis. 
However, which coding scheme is chosen depends on the task domain and the purpose of 
the analysis [178]. 
Table ‎4.1 Phases of Data Analysis 
Phase Objective Task 
Preparation  Get familiar with the data 
set 
Insure the quality of data 
and transcripts  
Use collected data into a 
structural process inquiry  
Records transcriptions completed and 
reviewed 
Prepare interview, transcript, notes 
and observation data to be analyzed 
Project issues and questions reviewed 
Develop the coding scheme 
Coding 
Data 
Examine Pieces and parts 
Classify the information 
Update the coding scheme 
Protocol Analysis Procedure to: 
Identify elements and segments  
Coding data related to the coding 
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Phase Objective Task 
Identify central decision 
questions 
schemes 
Adding new coding nodes as necessary 




Merge nodes and gather 
pieces’ of meanings 
Identify most important 
decision criteria  
Identify decision process 
Review for quality assurance 
Review using the updated coding 
scheme 
Structure, integrate and compare 
pieces 
Ranking, rating, and group contrasts 
Draw flow charts 




cross cases pattern 
information integration  
Identify decision behavior 
Make meaning visible 
Illustrate, compile and compare. 
Compare against decision heuristics 
research 
Integrate information to identify and 
model decision procedure  
The goal of the first phase of the analysis is to help get familiar with data and 
identify coding schemes that will be used in the analysis. Codes can be theory driven and 
developed from existing theory or concepts, data driven and developed from the raw data, 
or they can emerge from specific project goals and questions [178]. Once codes have 
been created, they are organized to develop a codebook. A codebook is a set of codes, 
definitions, and examples used to guide in analyzing qualitative data and provide a 
formalized operation of the codes [241]. 
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Audio recording and transcript will be reviewed and coded according to the 
identified codebook, and new codes will be added as needed. The goal of coding the 
interviews is to abstract information about the nature of the project that is contained in 
raw data. Each coding node represents a meaningful statement abstracted from the 
interview.  
Transcripts’ statements should not only be categorized with reference to listed 
coding categories. Codebooks might be more complex and contain sub categories [178], 
but they should also be analyzed collectively though a higher level of coding to enable 
researchers to identify any connection between codes [241]. Thus, all data should be 
reviewed again using the updated codes aiming to structure, integrate, compare pieces, 
and group contrasts [178]. The transformation of meaningful statements into codes is 
useful to understand the behavior and answer research question. Thus, the final phase 
would integrate and find results by applying cross case comparison, looking for patterns, 
and integrating pieces to come up with final results. Descriptive flowcharts and diagrams 
might be used as needed to represent the results. 
This lengthy data analysis approach- starting from defining coding schemes, 
building the codebook and going through coding and integration processes- attempts to 
capture in great detail the research information from rich qualitative data. 
Documenting the analysis process is critical for quality assurance [178]. Since it 
is challenging to keep track of the process, QSR NVivo the qualitative data analysis 
software will be used to keep track of the coding and the modifications. 
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4.3 Ensuring Reliability and Validity 
In qualitative research, validity cannot be determined by correlations, statistics or 
with scientific criteria associated with the experimental design. Instead, it is measured by 
ensuring the reliability of each step of data collection and analysis, and by determining 
whether other researchers can meaningfully extract the same insight from the data [228, 
242, 243]. 
Thus, validity threats has been identified and ruled out after a tentative account 
has been developed as suggested by research [244]. In the context of this study, validity 
gets at the question of whether the theoretical framework and the heuristics accurately 
capture the relevant aspects of human behavior [245]. Table ‎4.2 lists the validity threats 
which were identified and addressed during the course of the research. 
This research is not using a standard laboratory for knowledge elicitation; instead, 
it gathered the information from real experts about their screening experience of real 
projects. Standard laboratory studies usually do not use highly experienced participants, 
and tend to focus on the analytical skills needed to evaluate options. On most occasions, 
“they leave option generation as something of a mystery” [181] page 14. Campbell [246] 
described this approach as random generation of options, followed by analytical methods 
to identify and select the best option, which does not happen in early screening of new 




Like other cognitive research, we cannot determine absolutely to what extent were 
the participants simply telling the accurate account of each process. However, we 
developed a number of techniques designed to improve the accuracy and consistency of 
the interview data. Interview guide developed to focus probes on the direction of 
obtaining a rational deliberation description. The interview guide was developed in an 
attempt to balance between two objectives: keeping the interview as unstructured and as 
free from interviewer bias as possible, to allow respondents reflecting freely on their 
experiences and tell their stories, and at the same time, keep the collected data clear of 
unrelated information. A pilot interview, which lasted for an hour and forty minutes, 
showed that the interview questions and technique were capable of eliciting knowledge 
about the subject. Thus, interviewer directs the respondents to focus on those elements 
related to screening projects by asking them to give examples for previous projects. 
Furthermore, we believe that asking experts to report aspects of their decision processes 
is different from asking participants to consider on their motivations in an unfamiliar 
laboratory environment. This procedure seems to be successful, because “it seemed to 
establish the interviewer as a listener rather than as an interrogator” [181] page 20, which 
increases the cooperation [247]. 
In addition, a second method, thinking aloud, has been used to observe screening 
projects from the beginning to end. Although, verbal protocols as a data collecting have a 
long history in psychology, it has sometimes seen as an invalid variant of introspection. 
In our study, we tried to avoid the propensity for participants to speculate by asking them 
to speak about what they were actually seeing, and thinking at the moment. Using 
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thinking aloud eliminates any threats that respondent forget some details or could not 
retrieve all facts when telling the story. To ensure the quality of the method, three trial of 
thinking aloud procedure took place to ensure the quality of the technique before we 
applied it with expert. Rich data were collected on both practice of the interviewee and on 
the thinking aloud technique.  
Criteria have been defined using definition used in the literature to look up these 
criteria; in addition, two PhD candidates will be asked to review the definition of these 
criteria. To ensure reliability, as suggested by research [178, 248], all steps of the 
research were carefully documented, all interviews have been transcripts, codebook have 
been clearly described and kept up to date and reviewed regularly.  
 The structure and analyzing approach are clearly defined. Two interviews (one 
from each round) will independently be coded by a second researcher to check for inter-




Table ‎4.2 Validity Threats and Countermeasures 
Validity Threat Study Countermeasure 
The respondents might be 
unrepresentative 
Build the proficiency scaling based on at least on four 
methods to select SME 
Interview setting might 
not be efficient to 
illustrate the knowledge  
The pilot interview, which lasted for an hour and 40 
minutes, showed that the questions and technique 
were capable of eliciting rich data 
Three pilot tests of thinking aloud technique show the 
efficiency of the thinking aloud technique in collecting 
data and observing the decision process 
The information might be 
systematically biased 
Two methods have been used for collecting data to 
avoid methodology bias 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed to insure 
catching what participants said 
The decision settings 
might be artificial and 
unrealistic 
Collect context-rich data though telling stories and 
screening real proposals 
The researcher might 
influence the informant’s 
decision process 
Collect retrospective data on decisions which were 
made in the past 
The informants might 
selectively recall past 
decisions as being more 
structured than they 
actually were 
The second round of data collecting, observed 
screening while the process is happening 
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Classifying criteria or 
indicators used in the 
evaluation process were 
vague 
-Used the decision criteria and heuristics definitions 
from the literature to build a clear codebook 
-Add look up words and example to the codebook to 
define the indicators 
-A group of experts confirmed their agreement with the 
definitions 
The researcher might 
arrive at invalid or 
premature conclusions 
- Compare the decision process cross cases 
- To ensure the inter-coder reliability: A second 
researcher code two interviews (one from each round)  
A random subset of the code have been coded 
independently by two different researchers, 
 - Compare the decision process with other studies 
Quite apart from the issues relating to adequate memory of the responded when 
describing the judgment process, the question of whether self-examination is a valid 
means of collecting data about mental processes?, could be raised. Researches [181, 221, 
231] believe that introspection is a legitimate source of data. However, we do not 
consider it as a direct access to cognitive processes; instead, we consider it an exploratory 
method -with its own limitations -that capturing the context of phenol’s perspective and 
describe the decision making process in a real life. The attractiveness of knowledge 
elicitation methods is that they offer a rich source of data for building hypotheses. “The 
ultimate validity in relation to any proposed cognitive model will be judged by the usual 
standards of scientific acceptability” [181] page 188. Thus, all results will be checked 





As a core method of knowledge engineering, CTA is used to look into the black 
box of cognitive processes, and to describe these processes formally through models that 
make expert knowledge accessible for designing practical aids, expert systems, decision 
support tools, and training manuals [14, 171, 173, 180, 181].  
Within the CTA framework, two knowledge elicitation techniques were chosen to 
for this research: Critical Decision Method and Thinking Aloud. The use of retrospective 
protocols of stories and incidents allows research on naturalistic tasks that cannot be 
emulated in experiments and avoids any influence of the researcher on the respondent’s 
actual decision process Thinking aloud is a process tracing technique that observes 
participants while performing the task and thinking aloud. The approach allows 
researchers to witness and describe behavior in a work context and unveils a greater 
amount of specific task related information. To avoid the risk of recall biases, and offset 
the disadvantages of each method and minimize method biases, we applied both CTA 
approaches. Protocol analysis multi-phase approach is commonly used for coding data in 
cognitive researches, to obtain knowledge about decision screening behavior. Quality 
control was addressed to overcome the shortcoming of each method and to ensure the 




CHAPTER 5: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction  
As discussed in the prior section, this research follows and inductive approach and 
applies Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) to capture decision heuristic for screening 
projects at the FFE, on the level of the individual. For the purpose of this research, two 
knowledge elicitation techniques within the CTA framework - CDM and Thinking aloud 
- were chosen and applied sequentially to two different groups of respondents (Figure 
5.1). Within each method, data collection and initial analysis occurred concurrently 
before the insights gained from each method were compared and integrated. 
 
Figure ‎5.1 Data Collecting using Two CTA Methods 
 
The following sections describe the specific research steps and results. 
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5.2 Research Participants 
5.2.1  Subject Matter Expert 
Although the identification of experts is not considered much of a problem in the 
practice of experimental psychology and in expert system development and often occurs 
quite ad-hoc [215, 239], in contrast, this research employs a multi-criteria proficiency 
scale that is both domain and organizationally appropriate [14] to identify the Subject 
Matter Experts (SME). Respondents were selected according to four proficiency scales, 
(explained in more detail in Chapter 4) namely; experience, formal qualification, 
authority as a measure of performance, and social interaction analysis. The four scales are 
presented in Table ‎5.1. To be included in our research, respondents had to fulfill the 
proficiency standard for a minimum of three of the four proficiency measure.  
Table ‎5.1 Proficiency Scale Used in This Study to Identify Experts  
Scale 
ID 
Proficiency Scale Method Proficiency Measurement  Reference 
SC1  Experience Time Limit  Have minimum of 10 years of 
working experience  
[32, 178, 
198]  
SC2  Professional licensing, 
Education Degree  
Have a minimum of a B.A. 
degree in engineering or 
business  
[210, 211] 
SC3  Measures of Performance  Participants are authorized to 
make promotion decisions for 
projects, commit resources to 




outcome of the decision  
SC4  Social Interaction Analysis  Peers have suggested this 
person as expert in the field  
[14-16, 
209]  
5.2.2  Participants for CDM Interviews 
The selection of respondents for CDM interviews followed a two-step process: 
The first step requires identifying companies that employ decision makers who screen 
NPD projects and can thus serve for the purpose of this research. The second step is to 
sample suitable respondents from these companies through phone or emails. 
Since the research is interested in the heuristics used by individual decision 
makers to screen NPD projects, differences among the respondents’ companies, with 
regard to culture, location and size, are irrelevant. However, only companies with an 
active NPD program can be expected to regularly screen projects in the FFE. Therefore, 
only companies that are active in new product development were contacted. Six 
participants in our sample belong to semi-conductor companies with R&D intense 
industry that report new product releases on their company websites and/or annual 
reports. The rest of the sample works with companies that belong to sectors with low 
R&D intensity, such as designing and manufacturing new products, and employ 
managers with relevant screening experience. These organizations can be expected to 
experience the FFE challenges and constraints described in early in Chapter 2 . 
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Tens of short telephone prescreening and a hundred of emails have been sent 
targeting experts in order to identify decision makers who are authorized to make 
promotion decisions for projects, commit resources to it, and are responsible for the 
outcome of the decision. This focus excludes people who screen their own project ideas 
before sharing them with their superior or other people in the company, because these 
experts do not formally commit resources to the screening activity and cannot promote 
the project. However, this focus includes people who do not have the discretion to 
allocate resources and promote projects on their own, but do so as part of a group 
decision in, for example, project selection committee.  
Thirty two managers employed in high.-technology companies with active R&D 
pipelines and hold managerial positions, such as General Manager, President, VP of 
R&D and R&D or project manager in R&D, directly approached by the researcher. 
Because of the sensitivity, work load and travel commitment regard to their positions, 
only 9 of the 32 positively responded and voluntarily accepted to participate in this 
research. In these functions, all respondents are typically authorized to make promotion 
decisions for projects, commit resources to it, and are responsible for the outcome of the 
decision. In one case the decision maker did not have the discretion to allocate resources 
and promote projects on his own, but does so as part of a group decision in a project 
selection committee. All participants for this round fit the proficiency scale (Table ‎5.1).  
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5.2.3  Participants for Thinking Aloud Process Tracing 
Thinking aloud requires that the researchers know when the task will be 
performed to observe it, however, new product screening happened ad-hoc, time and 
place are unpredictable and researcher might wait for weeks before he observe any new 
product screening, To overcome this issue this technique often relies on specifically 
prepared ‘test cases’ that can create an artificial evaluation situation. Researcher had a 
great opportunity to observe a real setting of screening projects proposal. Members of a 
university committee, named Innovation Program Council who evaluate project proposal 
for innovative student projects in engineering accepted to participate in the research. 
They screen project proposal individually then as a group, accepted projects receive 
funding and other resources, such as faculty expertise. The selection process consists of 
several steps: in a first step, each council member selects the projects he or she wants to 
include in the council’s selection process by giving a grade on a 5 point scale. The scales 
are not used to rank order the projects and there is no set limit of the number of projects 
that a council member can promote. However, projects with poor average scores are not 
included in the further review, unless a council member strongly recommends their 
inclusion. The council members thus serve as gatekeepers. Based on the initial screening, 
projects are selected for presentation to the council. After the presentation the council 
decides on supporting the project or rejecting it. 
Out of the six members of a university committee have been contacted, three 
accepted to participate in this research. These respondents were experienced engineering 
professors who had previously served on the Innovation Program Council, as well as on 
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other project evaluation programs (e.g. for NASA and Venture Capital panels) (see Table 
‎5.2). 
Table ‎5.2 Summary‎of‎Research‎Participants’‎Qualifications 





1 GM of Enterprise Platform Server Division in 
high semi-conductor company  
 26 years of experience  
SC1, SC2, SC3, 
SC4 
45 Min 
2 GM of industrial automation companies, 
design and tests new products, worked as a 
manager in R &D  
22 years of experience  
SC1, SC2, SC3, 
SC4 
45 Min 
3 Process Development Manager at a High- 
Tech Company 
14 years of experience  
SC1, SC2, SC3, 
SC4 
40 Min 
4  Vice President of R&D in semi-conductor 
company  
 22 years of experience  
SC1, SC2, SC3  55 Min  
5 A Project manager in semiconductor h 
company severed for 5 years on new 
business creation team  
 23 years of experience  
SC1, SC2, SC3, 
SC4  
40 Min  
6 President of a strategic business acceleration 
and venture funding company, Licensing and 
Business Development 
15 years of experience  
SC1, SC SC3, SC4 45 Min 
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7  Technology Development organization and 
has been responsible for product developing  
17 years of experience  
SC1, SC2 SC4 35 Min 
8 Global Sourcing & Procurement Company 
6 years of experience  
SC1, SC2, SC3 30 Min 
9 R&D manager at a semiconductor company  
25 years of experience  




Group Respondent Summary Proficiency Scale Length of 
Interview 
Group 2 10  Associate professor had experience as an 
advanced development engineer, served in 
many panels for project evaluation  
23 years of experience  
SC1, SC2, SC4  50 Min 
11  Assistant professor, Vice President at an 
energy company, designing and managing 
appropriate technology programs 
11 years of experience  
SC2, SC3, SC4  30 Min 
12 Associate professor, serving in screening 
projects for several Venture Capital institutes  
20 years of experience  
SC1, SC2, SC3, 
SC4  
70 Min  
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5.3 Data Collection 
The objective of the data collection step with CDM and Thinking Aloud Process 
Tracing was the capture of verbatim interview responses on audiotape, but as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the interview techniques differed in both data collection steps.  
5.3.1  Using Critical Decision Model 
A semi structured interview was developed for this study, based on Flanagan’s 
[249] critical incident method, to start the conversation and guide the participant to focus 
on the attributes that most affected the decision, recall and reflect on one previous 
project. Interview was designed with attention to keep balance between two different 
objectives: keeping the interview free from interview bias as possible by allowing 
managers to represent their perspective freely, with avoid collecting unrelated 
information; which will be impossible to classify. Interview questions have been tested 
on 45 minutes, pilot interview, to check the efficiency of the method for collecting data 
for related this research (see Appendix C). 
Prior data collecting and interviewing the experts, the purpose of the study, and 
confidentiality agreement were discussed with each participant. Informed Consent Form 
(Appendix D) was sent to all of respondents by email prior the interview. Participants 
knew they were being studied, knew the type of information we were trying to obtain and 
they accepted to serve for data collection. All participants were assigned identification 
code, names of participants or their companies were not used in any of the transcripts or 
other data. There was no deception involved. Each interview took from thirty minutes to 
101 
 
an hour in length. To avoid missing any details or useful information, interviews have 
been routinely recorded, as long as participants accepted. For one interview that did not 
get to be recorded, interview note has been taken during and after the interview.  
Interviews were conducted using the guideline; we asked respondents to recall 
and reflect on one previous project, prompts and questions were used to the minimum to 
clarify information or ask about more details. All questions were open-ended to give a 
space for respondents to reflect on their experience.  
5.3.2  Using Thinking Aloud Process Analysis Technique  
For the process tracing, the three council members who accepted to participate in 
the research have been contacted and asked to evaluate the proposals in front of the 
researcher, think aloud while they are evaluating the projects, and give their comments 
about the proposals. The same procedure (as round one) of explaining the purpose of the 
project and sharing the consent form took place. Two council members were observed 
while they were screening a pile of project proposals. The third council member preferred 
to review the projects without thinking aloud but commented on each proposal and his 
screening decision in an interview that followed immediately after he had finished the 
screening; since he still had his comment on proposals, and remembered the details, he 
explained his screening process from the beginning to end. All statements were recorded. 
In addition, the interviewer took notes.  
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5.4 Data Analysis Approach 
This wealth of in depth material needed to be analyzed in such a way that the 
concepts developed and theoretical analysis would reflect the data well. Data analysis 
attempts to capture in, as rich detail as possible, the evaluation process from the point of 
view of the expert managers. Each story or example of a project – provided by the 
respondent-would be classified as decision case and used as the basis of the analysis. 
Researcher attempt to study the criteria been evaluated to make the decision, the process 
of the evaluation and any internal or external factors affect the decision making. Data 
analysis was done using the qualitative data analysis software, QSR NVivo 9, and it took 
place in four overlapped phases (see Figure 5.2).  
During the first phase the audio recording were transcript and reviewed. The 
researcher went through every transcript; breaking it down into discrete chunks to 
facilitate analysis. Notes were taken, through the full data set, about the various criteria 
used to evaluate projects, as well as stories about decisions, the explanation of screening 
techniques and the decision questions asked to help make decisions. These notes were 
used to develop an initial codebook. A codebook is a set of codes, definitions and 
examples used as a guide to help analyzing the data, and providing a formalization of the 
codes [250]. The goal of this first round of data analysis is to get familiar with the data; 
identify the codebook and to build systematic examination. At this point the initial 




During the second phase, researcher code all the transcripts word by word to 
abstract information about the nature of the FFE project evaluation, criteria that have 
been used in screening projects, and the process or behavior applied in making decision. 
New codes were added when there was indication that the codes had not capture some 
features. Each coding node represents a meaningful statement abstracted from the 
transcript. Coding was a lengthy process, each interview requires 7 to 10 hours of coding. 
Generating these codes was one of the most challenging tasks in the analysis, since they 
could not simply be determined; code generation required understanding of human 
behavior as well as nature of the fuzzy front end. As new aspects became apparent, 
resulting in a codebook with 52 concepts. QSR NVivo 9 was used to conduct coding, 
managing and analyzing the large volume of data generated for this study. After the first 
coding round, the researcher identified reoccurring topics across all cases, which lead to 
further refinement of the codebook. The final codebook contained 42 codes. Excerpts 
from the codebook are provided in Table ‎5.3 (also see Appendix E). All transcripts were 
re-coded to this final codebook by the researcher. 
To demonstrate effectiveness in classifying criteria or indicators used in the 
evaluation process, criteria have been defined using definition used in the literature to 
look up these criteria; in addition, one professor and two PhD candidates confirmed their 





Figure ‎5.2 Phases of Data Analysis 
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Table ‎5.3 Excerpts from the Codebook 
Class Coding Node Description  Look up 
Words 
Example Frequency  Note  
Criteria Product 
Concept 
How good and 


























or at least 
have the 
knowledge to 
























of one or 
multiple 
reasons  
 Even though 
it was a good 
idea, it 
doesn’t fit 






In the case of the present research, a transformation from meaningful statements 
into coding node has been used, rather than propositions, to apply functionally-
appropriate level of analysis [178]. Each code node would be a piece to understand the 
decision behavior and identify the heuristics approach in the later stages of the analysis. 
For example the following paragraph has been broken into six code nodes as shown in 
Table ‎5.4. 
“It was technically going to take three years to have it ready and then we were 
going to get 15% of a market that we have not been in, but we never managed to finish it. 
I’m sorry; this is the dumbest thing I’ve ever heard in my life. Unless it’s the best idea, 
when you go into a market and you’ve got to deal with any existing competition, it takes 
you three years to get where you think you need to be.” 
Table ‎5.4 Example of Coding 
Phrase Code 
“technically going to take three years” Production Time 
“going to get 15% of the market” Market Opportunity 
“market that we have not been in” New Market 
“Unless it’s the best idea” Product Concept 
“deal with any existing competition” Competitors 
In the third phase researcher reviewed the codes regard the updated codebook and 
drew flow charts. 
The following example shows a chart illustrated from a transcript (Figure ‎5.3) 
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“Now if I just (ranked) the three of those and you come in and you have a, ok 
return, but not very high risk or I’m much more likely to do that. And so the other one is 
there’s the context of just what’s my overall portfolio, right? I’m much more likely to 
grab your idea, right, because I’m going to be thinking, “I have three of them where I’m 
swinging for the fences, and when you try to hit a home run, a lot of times you strike out. 
So I got those. So you come in, you could get me on first base, it’s a solid business, it’s 
not going to be high risk, it’s not going to change the world, but we’re going to make 
some money on it. I may be able to build off that franchise, I may not be able to. Well 
then, I’m probably going to do it. Now, if I haven’t done any home runs and you come in 
with this home run idea.” 
 
Figure ‎5.3 Chart Illustrated Form an Interview Transcript 
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A progressive literature search was conducted in parallel with data analysis to 
serve as another source of quality assurance. Cases in hand were tested against different 
heuristics’ definition and examples in the literature to identify the right heuristic. New 
heuristic been identified and all data been re-coded against these heuristic to ensure the 
sustainability and enhance accuracy. Later in the analysis; phase 4, essential categories 
and well known decision heuristics were chosen to serve as a vehicle for integration and 
improvement. Coding and descriptive flowcharts and diagrams were then used to build 
the model. 
Research analysis identified 66 decision cases, gathered form twelve interviews. 
The end product of selection coding was a dataset of 22 decision criteria, list of decision 
questions and four decision heuristics. 
To ensure reliability, as suggested by research [178, 248], all steps of the research 
were carefully documented, all interviews have been transcripts, codebook have been 
clearly described and kept up to date and reviewed regularly. 
The structure and analyzing approach were clearly defined. Two interviews (one 
from each round) were independently coded by a second researcher to check for inter-
coder reliability, as suggested by researches [214, 221, 234]. Results on inter-coder 
reliability show codification agreement of 85%. In addition, two PhD candidates have 
been asked to code random pieces of the interviews. The matching results of 86% 




Two of the knowledge elicitation techniques were applied to collect data. A total 
66 decision cases were collected from interviewing twelve respondents from companies 
with active R&D pipelines, and from the Innovation Program Council. Four proficiency 
scale methods were applied to choose these expert respondents. Data analysis was done 
using QSR NVivo 9, the qualitative data analysis package, and took place in four 
overlapped phases: preparing data, structuring and coding, finding meaning, and 
integrating a codebook was developed collaboratively through several rounds of going 
through the interview reports, the interview guide, and the original research proposal. 
Data analysis process focused on identifying information about the nature, context and 
process of front end project evaluation, criteria used in project screening, and the 
sequence and structure of decision points. The goal of the painstaking analysis process is 
to abstract information about the nature of the FFE project evaluation (serve answering 
RQ1), criteria have been used in screening projects (serve answering RQ2), and the 
process or behavior applied in making decision (serve answering RQ3). The results of 





CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH RESULTS  
The results of this study answer three research questions: what are the main 
objectives and constrains for FFE project screening? What are the criteria used in the 
evaluation process and how are they integrated and used to discern alternatives? Are 
similar heuristics used by different decision makers? These questions are answered by 
identifying the context of the heuristics (section 6.1), the structure of heuristics (section 
‎6.2), types of heuristics identified (section‎6.3) and then integrating the results into a 
decision model (section 6.4 and 6.5). 
6.1 Context of Heuristics  
The research analysis shows that the fuzzy front end of project screening is, 
indeed, fuzzy; there is no standard path through the front end and none of the decision 
makers use a structured decision approach. Ideas are evaluated individually as they come 
in; there is no evidence that decision makers compare multiple project ideas against each 
other and select ideas that they fund. The only comparison mentioned by respondents is a 
comparison of ideas against projects that already exist in the project portfolio – if an idea 
is a long term investment and there are already many other long term investment in the 
portfolio it may be rejected because of this.  
No centralized documentation of early stage product idea exists. Managers can 
recall individual projects, but they are unable to recount their complete story from initial 
idea through informal and ad-hoc screening stages, to formal project evaluation, 
development, and product launch because the managers' responsibilities and involvement 
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with the project change through the lifecycle of the project. Despite this lack of feedback-
learning opportunities, managers compare current project proposals with past projects or 
previous experiences to identify patterns of success and failure. This occurs in an ad-hoc 
and somewhat intuitive manner: 10 out of 12 respondents in the study mentioned that 
they rely on their own personal experience, which has been mentioned in the discussion 
25 times. As an example, one of the respondents (R12) said: 
“You know, it was a really very creative idea in fact so creative that nobody has 
done anything like it, and you know nobody had done this idea. It wasn’t close enough to 
any existing work that I can even evaluate it.”  
Respondents furthermore mentioned gut feeling as a guiding inner voice in the 
evaluation process 45 times.  
Overall, they characterize the decision processes as fluid, uncertain and 
characterized by a need to act fast. Screening decisions at this stage are based on fast and 
preliminarily evaluations of projects. One of the respondents (R5) describes the needed 
decision at this stage to be:  
“Fast in time to no (N-O) or know (K-N-O-W). We wanted to get to ‘K-N-O-W’ if 
we should move forward or ‘N-O’, to reject it fast.”  
Initial screening decisions are made despite very high levels of uncertainty about 
customer preference, markets, competition, and general economic trends because 
decision makers feel gathering additional information will not dramatically reduce 
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uncertainty, but might lead to delays that could cause the product to miss the market 
window. For example, responded (R3) mentioned:  
”And so, I could have- at that point- taken two approaches, one is not commit, 
and then spend weeks and weeks collecting data in hope of showing that we can do 
something, but, it would have impacted a lot of the other work we do. So, I chose to take 
the risk.” 
To manage uncertainty, some managers employ an exploratory strategy of 
allowing several projects to move forward with the knowledge that some will be 
discontinued later. For example (R3) said: 
“Sometimes we’ll get after two ideas for quite some time until we have to make 
the commitment. And say, ok we need to go this way“ 
Respondents describe their decision processes as asking a series of questions 
about the project, such as “What are other products in the market that are close to this 
product?”, “Why is my product different?”, “Do I have the technology or sufficient 
knowledge about it?" or "How much market share do I expect?” All questions mentioned 
by the respondents pertain to their decision criteria, which are discussed in the next 
section. 
6.2 Structure of Heuristics 
Not surprisingly, the decision criteria differ from respondent to respondent. All 
respondents think about the detailed tasks and success factor for the particular project at 
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hand and select criteria accordingly. Five respondents additionally approach project ideas 
from a portfolio perspective and ask how the product idea serves the company's business 
strategies; Appendix F shows the criteria used by each respondent. 
The most frequently mentioned criterion that was mentioned by all respondents is 
technical feasibility (coded 63 times). It also seems to be the single most important 
criterion that respondents use to make early reject decisions: if they do not see how the 
project can potentially succeed technically, they reject it without further investigation. 
Other frequently mentioned criteria are: product concept (how solid and comprehensible 
is the idea to the decision maker), which has been mentioned in 52 codes, and customer 
need, mentioned 43 times (see Table 6.1).  
For the most part, the research confirmed the decision criteria for project 
screening that are discussed in the literature and implemented in analytical screening 
tools. However, respondents also identified three criteria that the screening literature 
rarely mentions; creating a new norm (mentioned 21 times), personal interest or 
enthusiasm for the idea (mentioned 25 times), and credibility or reputation which include 
the reputation of the idea giver (mentioned 38 times), the impact it would have on 
decision makers' reputation if he were to promote the idea (mentioned 5 times) and the 
impact on the brand reputation (3 times). On average respondents mentioned 11.41 
unique criteria (SD = 3.7) and thus substantially fewer than the criteria catalogues 
published in the literature that contain between 37-45 criteria [46, 60, 87, 134, 256]. 
Respondents in the process tracing group mentioned fewer unique criteria (mean = 8.67, 
SD = 2.49) than respondents in the CDM group (mean = 12.33, SD = 3.62), which is to 
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be expected: while CDM reflects on cases embedded in several different decision 
situations, process tracing only capture one particular decision situation and the criteria 
used in this particular context. Differences in the number of unique criteria mentioned by 
the respondent hint at strong individual differences and are not likely to be an artifact of 
the interview protocol or interview length: in the CDM group respondent 1 was 
interviewed for 45 minutes and mentioned more unique criteria than any other respondent 
(21), whereas respondent 4 could only identify 11 criteria in 55 minutes, using the same 
interview protocol. Table 6.2 summarizes the criteria and the frequency with which they 
have been mentioned in the evaluation process. Appendix F presents the same 









Yes                      No 
Frequency Notes 
Business Scope X  14  
Company Portfolio X  10 Not Identified in 
literature as screening 
criteria 
Competitors X  31  
Creating a New Norm / 
New Idea 
 X 21  
Credibility/Reputation 










Customer Needs  X  43  
Future state of the 
economy  
X  3 Not Identified in 
literature as screening 
criteria 
Funding  X  20  
Manufacturing Time 
and Process 
X  8  
Market Opportunity / 
Growth  
X  37  







Yes                      No 
Frequency Notes 
Personal Interest or 
Enthusiasm 
 X 25  
Product Concept X  52  
Profitability X  23  
Resources X  13  
Risk X  19  
Size of Investment  X  11  
Technical Feasibility X  63  
Technology Significance X  15  
It is noteworthy that the respondents feel that some criteria are more important 
than others and only use the less important ones when they cannot reach a decision based 
on the important criteria. They do not evaluate criteria independently, but lump them 
together in groups of criteria because they suspect them to have an interdependent 
relationship, for example, high return always goes with high risk and R&D costs and 
should consequently be assessed together. They also feel that some criteria cannot be 
evaluated without consideration for other criteria, for example, they evaluate the expected 
R&D costs in comparison to size of the business opportunity.  
6.3 Decision Heuristics  
All respondents, other than respondent 3, use two or more heuristics. In total, four 
main heuristic approaches were identified: recognition, elimination (in two variations), 
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conjunctive, and tallying heuristics. Appendix G represent which heuristics was used by 
each respondent. All four heuristics are described and modeled in the following section. 
6.3.1  Recognition Heuristic  
The recognition heuristic has been described in the literature as recognizing a 
plausible course of action as the first one to consider [103, 171] (See Error! Reference 
ource not found.).  
 
Figure ‎6.1 Recognition Heuristic Flowchart 
In 16 cases respondents reported that they reject project when they do not see 
sufficient similarity of the product concept, the technology it requires, or the business 
context of the project and their experience – because they do not recognize enough 
familiar aspects, they reject the idea as out of scope. As an example, respondent R12 said: 
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“You know, it was a really very creative idea in fact so creative that nobody had 
done anything like it. It wasn’t close enough to any existing work that I can even evaluate 
it.” 
This rejection typically stops any further evaluation. Only one respondent (R11), 
who is one of the innovation council members and therefore has easy access to other 
project screeners, mentioned the possibility that the rejected idea may find a sponsor after 
all: 
”So, If I don’t feel that I know enough about the proposal, I probably bring some 
outside help or else give it away to the committee who organize, just defer to the member 
who actually knows what is going on. So, I’ll have some interesting questions to my 
colleagues on this first proposal, but my… off hand… is no… I would rather to see a 
different proposal” 
No other respondent mentioned this possibility. Typically the unrecognized idea 
dies unless the proposer pitches it successfully to a different decision maker.  
6.3.2 Elimination by Aspect 
Once the decision is made to evaluate the project, most decision makers strive to 
weed out bad ideas very quickly, by applying a subset of criteria that are of particular 
importance to them. If a project does not reach a minimum level on the most important 
criteria, it will be rejected without consideration regardless of how well idea performs 
with regard to other criteria. Tversky explains this process as “At each stage in the 
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process, an aspect is selected (with probability proportional to its weight), and all the 
alternatives that do not include the selected aspect are eliminated. The process continues 
until all alternatives but one is eliminated” [251] page 281. The flow charts that abstract 
this heuristic follow the structure of the flowchart shows in Error! Reference source not 
ound., where it counts the negative values of criteria in a counter; if the decision maker 
has enough reason (N negative values for criteria) to eliminate this project, the project 
will be rejected; if not he will go through another evaluation afterward.  
In the following quote, respondent (R7) explains that he eliminates projects with 
low return of investment:  
“I look at the ones that are out there and rule out the ones that are economically 
prohibitive, some that I say, look, even if we can make it, it’ll be so expensive that we can 
never do it profitably.” 
Similarly, another respondent (R10) talks about elimination based on technical 
feasibility: 
“I think RFID has a very short active distance, like when we go into the door 
here, I take my wallet out and I have to push it up, almost to touch the door, right? So, to 




Figure ‎6.2 Elimination- by- Aspect Heuristic Flowchart 
Another respondent (R4) refers to a rule of thumb used to eliminate projects:  
“As a rule of thumb the revenue generated- probably in the third or fifth year- has 
to be at least 1% of the company’s total revenue in order to be significant, less than that - 
they’re going to say who cares, why I should put money in this, it is a waste of time. 
Unless there is a strategic reason: you say we got do this because if we do not do this our 
competitors... different story. “ 
Some decision makers attempt to assign a project to mental categories, a process 
known in the literature as Categorization-by-Elimination (CBE). CBE “uses only as many 
of the available cues or features as are necessary to first make a specific categorization, 
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and eliminate those who do not fit with any category” [89] page 54. Categories are based 
on the respondent’s mental category for projects of the type ‘accepted’ and projects of the 
type ‘rejected’. Each category is based on different criteria. The project has to achieve a 
minimum level for each criterion in a category to be assigned to the category.  
Categorization heuristics have been observed mostly through thinking aloud 
procedure (see Appendix G). The following quote was taken while the respondent (R12) 
was screening proposals and stacking them into different piles: the ‘go pile’, ‘may be yes 
pile’, ‘may be no pile’, and the ‘no go pile’: 
“So, there are probably four proposals in here out of the nineteen where you just 
say “yeah, yeah, yeah”….there is these for “partly okay”-. This one is probably in the 
no-ish pile; this one is probably in the no-ish pile, [respondent looks at a third paper]… 
probably no-ish pile” 
6.3.3 Conjunctive Heuristic 
The conjunctive heuristic is based on satisfaction levels [250]. A project idea that 
did not get rejected in an initial cut is checked against a list of ‘must-haves.’ Once the 
decision maker reaches a level of satisfaction, he makes an acceptance decision (See 
Figure 6.3). The conjunctive heuristic was first observed in consumer choice by Hauser 
[250] and also becomes apparent in the study, as the following example highlights where 
the respondent (R9) clearly said:  
“If you see it is promising enough, you should take the risk.” 
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Sometimes the decision depends on satisfaction with the project based on one 
important criterion, such as confidence in the idea, enthusiasm for the project, or – as in 
the case below – the potential for consensus among decision makers that will be involved 
later: 
“We don’t have a formal process for that, my vote is worth so much... Ultimately, 
at the end of the day, I think if I can’t reach a consensus its likely going to probably be 
“no”. We have to really be able to reach alignment on whether this makes sense or not, 
and if I can’t then it’s probably no.” 
 
Reject 
Start with most important criterion 
P-Counter =0, N-Counter=0 














If P-Counter>= P  
No 









Figure ‎6.3 Conjunctive Heuristic Flowchart 
6.3.4 Tallying 
Some decision makers seem to weigh the pros and cons of the project. To do so 
they look at all criteria on the same level of importance and compare the number of 
criteria in favor of accepting (pros) against the number of criteria in favor of rejecting 
(cons). If they are even, they move to the next level of importance and repeat the process 
for all criteria on that level, until a decision can be made. This level-wise tallying 
heuristic is an advanced form of tallying [114, 168]. It considers arguments on the same 
level of importance. Interdependent criteria are included on the same level. The heuristic 
computes the score by adding up the number of pros and then subtracting the number of 
its cons (on the same level). As respondents (R1) mentioned: 
“In general we approach it as: let’s expose it - by the way of the pros and cons.” 
A project is chosen if its net score meets the predefined minimum expectation 
level of the decision maker (See Figure ‎6.4), as the following quote from respondent R8 
shows: he weighs all arguments in favor of the project against his concerns before he 
reaches a decision: 
“Ok, a product has been proposed to make a new piece of technology (I don’t 
want to go through the details), the product concept was good, it sounds solid and it is 
achievable, we can make it. The proposer thought that we have the ability to market it 
through the same channels we market our current products, we just need to advertise for 
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it as we advertise for any new products, and he showed me some estimation for a good 
return of investment... it sounded good, but I struggled for a while because this 
investment is not within our core business, we are not familiar with this market.” 
  
Figure ‎6.4 Tallying Heuristic Flowchart 
6.4  Integration of Results 
In this research individual managers show that project screening does not occur 
through a single screening heuristic, but through a sequence of heuristics that vary 
between respondents and situations. Table 6.2 shows the times each of these heuristics 
presented in the cases. The same information, organized by respondent, is included in 
Appendix G. 
How does the 
project satisfy 
this criterion? 
Add the value to the 
counter 














Table ‎6.2 Heuristics Presented in the Cases 






Make a decision depending on 
recognizing or not recognizing 
the idea by the decision maker 
16 8 
Heuristic-EBA Eliminate the project because of 




Categorize this project under 




Reach a level of satisfaction to 
make a decision  
10 6 
Heuristic- Tallying  Evaluate pros and cons of the 
project 
10 7 
A commonality of the observed screening approaches is an initial focus on 
recognition and elimination-by-aspect. With the exception of respondent 3, who only 
pointed out one heuristic (Tallying), each respondent is either using recognition (3 
respondents), or EBA (3 respondents) or both in sequence (5 respondent). Both heuristics 
rely on a very small number of criteria or a single reason that lead to rejection. 
Respondent (R6) clarify this order when he said: 
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“So, I think, the first factor in deciding. If it is a great idea for us, is this kind of 
product or brand that we understand? Is it something that we deeply understand? And 
understand its customer? So, that’s a big one for us. If we say no to that; if it’s not 
something that we have that level of understanding, we‘re probably not going to take a 
look at it. So the first consideration for us is that” 
Ideas have to overcome the initial elimination steps in order to be evaluated more 
thoroughly, based on one of the three heuristics of categorization, conjunctive, or tallying 
heuristics, or a combination thereof. These heuristics use more criteria than the initial 
steps, but by no means the 37 and more criteria that are described in the literature as part 
of decision aids. 
Overall the study thus confirmed that managers ignore some information and use 
fast approaches to reach a ‘good enough’ solution that ‘satisfices’, rather than seeking 
and optimal solution: as can be seen in Appendix G, all respondents (but respondent 3) 
have at least one very simple heuristic, based on few criteria, and one more complex 
heuristic that takes more criteria into account in their repertoire. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that they adapt their heuristic strategy to the situation, if one set of criteria and 
one particular heuristic does not lead to conclusive results, additional criteria and 
heuristic approaches are added. In that sense, managerial screening heuristics are 
ecologically rational [89]. For example respondent R9 chose different criteria to eliminate 
project ideas; in the first decision case he relied on 2 criteria, namely technical feasibility 
and financial return,  
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“I don’t want to go after a new idea until I'm sure I can do it both financially and 
technically.” 
While in a second decision case he rejected an idea because it was out of the business 
scope: 
“Even with that, we choose not to invest in it because it is out of the company 
scope; it is not what we have been doing and it might takes the company into a different 
direction” 
A general integration model that shows a logical sequence of the decision heuristics 











N is a constant variable represent the maximum number of negative criteria 
P is a constant variable represent the minimum number of positive criteria 
Tallying 
N= Total number of criteria, and P= 0 
Elimination by Aspect 
N < half of number of criteria, and P= 0  
Conjunctive  
N < half number of criteria, and P = minimum number of positive criteria need 
to be approved  
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This integrated model does not show the decision process of any particular 
decision maker, but highlights at which stage in the screening process the different 
screening heuristics are likely to be used. Individual differences may exist. It is 
furthermore noteworthy that the thinking aloud procedure elicited more different decision 
heuristics per respondent (mean= 4.33, SD= 0.577) than the CDM (mean= 2.11, SD= 
0.6009) (see Appendix G), which points at the difficulty of respondents to recollect past 
screening processes in full. However, each heuristic described above was identified by 
both elicitation methods at least once. It is therefore unlikely that they are an artifact of 
the interview process. 
6.5 Unassigned heuristics 
This study identified 66 decision cases – in 59 of these cases the respondents’ 
decision heuristic for the particular case was identifiable and could be matched to one of 
five fast and frugal strategies above. In 7 cases, the respondents’ particular decision 
strategy could not be clearly identified. 
In some cases this was the result of the respondent’s inability to remember all 
information related to the decision making. For example, one respondent (R8) described a 
process of weighing pros and cons for a project, which may point at a tallying strategy, 
but could not provide sufficient detail:  
“In the past, the company developed and produced a video camera, it was a big 
mistake... yes we had the ability (in term of resources, technology, etc.) but it is not our 
core business... We designed a somewhat a nice video camera, with some unique features 
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(I don’t remember exactly what were the features, but it supposed to do something cool at 
that time.) It was completely a new market for us, with tough competitors. So, we couldn’t 
compete in this high competitive market where some good brands are already there (you 
know, Sony, Samsung, Toshiba, Canon,…), the estimated market share we had was 
already small and we did not even get it.”  
In other cases respondents described decisions incompletely and in very general 
terms, despite the interviewer’s effort to get respondents to talk about specifics. One such 
example is respondent R4, who recalls a decision process with a negative outcome that he 
blames on unspecified internal politics – the many omissions and incomplete sentences 
hint at the fact that the respondent was distraught thinking about past events:  
“Well it was bringing a kind of new technology, I mean.... a company basically 
drills holes in tiny, tiny holes in various electronic circuit using lasers, and this was a 
new way of manipulating to give optimal drawing characteristics. The company was 
highly political and if certain people did not think it is going to work, they would intend 
to fight you. We proposed it anyway and we went forwarding with it, damn it did not 
work.” 
Another respondent (R4) tried to generalize the process instead of giving 
information about a specific project:  
“The judgment made relative to the maturity of the staging of the technology as 
well as the size and importance of the market opportunity” 
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“You have one project that has high risk and if it succeeds you will get good 
present for your business (revenue, market share, branding…), and another project that 
has, maybe, not high risk but also may not give us the best results (low revenue). In our 
case, we recognize that sometimes you have to take a risk and your portfolio should 
contain a bunch of high risk high payoff, medium risk maybe medium to low payoff, and 
then sure things you got to do and you got to get into production”  
The latter statement hints at the possible use a priority heuristic [94] that first 
assesses what could be gained/lost in the worst case and if this does not suffice to make a 
decision, further evaluates how probable it is that these gains or losses occur and what the 
best positive outcome would be. However, as in the case with the general statement about 
decision criteria, the respondent comments are not specific enough to draw conclusions. 





CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.1 Discussion  
This research is one of the first to open the black box of managerial intuition by 
investigating decision makers' screening heuristics in the fuzzy front end through 
cognitive task analysis. Not unexpectedly, it confirms that decision makers who are faced 
with very limited information, lack of time, and scarce resources use mental shortcuts to 
quickly reach a decision to promote a product idea or to reject it. The decision makers, 
who serve as gatekeepers [5, 37, 239] for new ideas make their initial screening decision 
individually, in an unstructured environment, with no involvement of other decision 
makers and without any documentation of proposed ideas and decisions. They 
furthermore do not typically see the proposed and approved projects through to their final 
outcome, which may occur years later and after major modifications to the initial idea. As 
a result, decision makers face a situation that is less than ideal for feedback learning, yet 
they rely on their cumulated experience to determine what criteria to apply and which 
heuristic to pull from their repertoire of decision strategies. Depending on an individual's 
past learning opportunities and experiences they may reach different decisions, even if 
presented with the identical project in the identical situation. 
The heuristics of the decision makers in this study have all been described in other 
contexts before - not surprisingly, early stage project screening does not follow 
fundamentally different cognitive strategies than other decisions. Decisions follow a 
satisficing strategy and are based on few criteria that are sufficient for a "good enough" 
solution. However, the respondents do not use the most simplistic (e.g., lexicographic) 
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fast and frugal strategies. They furthermore face decision problems that seem to 
frequently require a combination of several F&F decision strategies, as the integration 
model in Figure 6.5 demonstrates: early on in the decision process, ideas have to be not 
rejected to survive - decision makers use recognition and elimination-by-aspect, based on 
one (recognition) or very few (elimination-by-aspect) criteria as their key strategies. Once 
an idea has made is past this hurdle, other, less decisive criteria are evaluated and pros 
and cons are weighted. With the exception of respondent 3, each respondent has at least 
one early and one later-stage decision heuristic in his repertoire (see Appendix G). 
Respondents thus use ‘fast and frugal’ strategies but in a complex combination, which 
highlights the ongoing discussion about the applicability of fast and frugal heuristics as 
plausible models of cognition [252, 253].  
The decision maker's focus on ecological rationality and single (or few) reason 
decision making may furthermore make it challenging for them to apply many of the 
multi-criteria decision tools recommended for later stage project screening, such as 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [50] and scoring models [27]. Moreover, these 
approaches require that criteria are treated independently, while respondents in this 
survey clearly lump criteria together. This may contribute to the lack of usage of these 
tools in practice [22, 37]. 
This study sheds some light on the individual differences that exist with regard to 
the criteria (see Appendix F) and heuristics (see Appendix G) despite their comparable 
backgrounds and, in some cases also positions, respondents differ considerably, and even 
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the same respondent (e.g. R9 mentioned above) use different criteria and heuristics in 
different decision cases: 
A total of 23 screening criteria were identified in this study. Across all 
respondents the study thus found substantially fewer criteria than the criteria catalogues 
described in the literature, but also identified several additional criteria that were focused 
on personal interests and reputation. Two criteria, namely technical feasibility and 
competition, were mentioned by all respondents. Technical feasibility was furthermore 
the most frequently mentioned criterion and referred to 63 times. Other very frequently 
mentioned criteria are the solidity and clarity of the product concept (52 references) and 
customer needs (43 references), yet product concept was not mentioned by 3, and 
customer needs were not mentioned by 2 respondents. Moreover, 10 criteria were 
mentioned by less than half (≤ 5) respondents - among them generally accepted screening 
criteria like manufacturability and growth of the potential market. Overall, respondents 
thus operate with a relatively short list of decision criteria (average 11.41), from which 
they select a subset for each decision case. Their choice of criteria in each decision case 
is subjective and may be a suitable adaptation to their specific work environment - for 
example, manufacturability may pose little challenges for equipment manufacturers who 
assemble few product units with highly flexible production equipment. It may, however, 
also introduce problematic ‘blind spots’, such as passion for technology with little regard 
for true customer needs. However, as long as these potentially problematic screening 
decisions are caught at a later stage, but still relative early in the product development 
process, they are likely to have only minor impacts. 
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A more severe problem may arise if the criteria and screening heuristics used by 
individuals systematically discourage potentially valuable ideas: the strong focus on 
recognition as a heuristic (8 out of 12 respondents) may pose a problem because any idea 
that does not look sufficiently similar to past experiences is rejected. Furthermore, several 
of the frequently mentioned criteria have an element of decision makers wanting to stay 
in their comfort zone: they all emphasize technical feasibility (which at the early stage the 
projects are evaluated in is a judgment call) and mention their own interests and 
enthusiasm, as well as the need to preserve their credibility as relevant for their decision. 
These decision practices may make it difficult to find sponsors for truly innovative, out-
of-the-box ideas and may lead to a systematic initiation gap for radical innovations, 
which has been observed by [13]  
7.2 Limitation 
By employing two complementary data collection approaches to research the 
screening behavior of 12 experienced decision makers, this study was able to open the 
black box of the early stages of new product development. However, some limitations 
exist. 
The study was unable to observe heuristic project screening in real-time in its 
real-world setting. Such observations would require the researcher to shadow decision 
makers for extended periods of time and to do ad-hoc process-tracing study, based on 
thinking aloud protocols, whenever an idea is proposed and evaluated - clearly an 
impracticable research design. This study therefore combined CDM and process tracing 
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concurrently: CDM was able to investigate decision contexts and uncovered the range 
and variability of decision criteria, while process tracing was particularly successful in 
uncovering decision heuristics.  
The study is unable to explain the differences between decision makers, which 
would require both deeper insights into their current work environment and a full 
understanding of how the respondents have acquired their heuristic knowledge. This 
limitation should be addressed in future studies. 
7.3 Implications and Future Research 
This research provides several opportunities for improving management practices 
and for pursuing further research. 
This research has observed differences in the criteria and heuristics managers 
employ to screen projects, and demonstrated their variability across different decision 
points. It is currently unclear to what extent these variations are reflection of individual 
decision making styles and to what extent they are adaptations to the particular decision 
situation at hand. Deeper insights into these issues will make it possible to understand 
what makes reportedly successful gatekeepers more successful than others: do they have 
better heuristic strategies in their toolbox or are they better at choosing from their toolbox 
the heuristic that is most appropriate for the situation? This understanding can potentially 
lessen a managerial bottleneck in the fuzzy front end since it is difficult and time-
consuming to accumulate screening expertise, experienced gatekeepers are scarce and 
product ideas often ‘linger around’ in the front end for extended periods of time [29]. In 
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addition, there may be individual differences in the way people apply different heuristic 
or choose more analytical processes over heuristics. If these differences could be 
established and validated, it might help assign individuals to conditions where analytical 
evaluations are necessary versus those where analytical evaluations are not possible. 
By providing one of the first formal models of a decision maker’s screening 
behavior, the study provides both a research and a potential training tool. As a research 
tool it enables research to investigate the quality, accuracy and overall effectiveness of 
heuristic project screening approaches and compare them to fully rational models, rather 
than assuming that heuristics are systematically inferior. This will shift the focus of 
project screening research from the identification of screening criteria, the majority of 
which are not considered in the early screening process, to the heuristic strategies with 
which they are evaluated, providing a much needed addition to the state-of-the-art tools 
currently available. Prior research [132] shows that the same criteria, evaluated with 
different heuristic approaches, can lead to very different project selection decisions. 
Moreover, the model will help to understand systematic biases in decision makers’ 
screening strategies: Which strategies lead to more or less project rejections? Which one 
is better at picking winners? Does the recognition heuristic at the beginning of the 
screening process lead to a systematic initiation gap for radical innovations as observed 
by Colarelli O'Connor et.al [13]? And does this have a lasting impact on the level of 
innovation throughout the front end pipeline or are there always enough good ideas that 
take the place of a wrongfully rejected idea, as [29] states? 
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The models resulting from this study could potentially also serve as decision 
support approaches and training programs that communicate the strategies of successful 
decision makers to their less experienced peers. This could provide great benefits by 
overcoming the bottleneck of experienced front end screeners and improving decision 
outcomes, as the use of simple decision-aids in medical decision making demonstrate 
[104], where it may be more efficient for training programs to be re-conceptualized to 
emphasize the perceptual learning needed to make fine discriminations and the array of 
experiences needed to develop situational awareness skills. This question is of particular 
importance because the fuzzy front end is a less than ideal learning environment for 
experiential learning and screening expertise therefore only builds up very slowly (or not 
at all), unless some support is provided. Further research will clarify if this is best 
achieved by codifying and transferring successful heuristics, by using a simulation-based 
learning environment that provides feedback and thus allows managers to develop 
adequate and individual heuristics much more quickly than real world experiences [44], 
or a combination thereof. 
While many of these potential applications of these research findings still require 
future research, this study also provides some short-term managerial implications. 
Companies need to understand and appreciate that decision makers heavily rely on 
heuristics for screening innovative ideas and should attempt to put the best possible 
heuristics to work. This suggests that decision makers need experience that allows them 
to quickly recognize the most important criteria to evaluate, and to recognize the 
dynamics of the project and the market to be able to make judgment according to these 
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criteria. This requires opportunities for feedback learning by communicating decisions, 
criteria, and outcomes to initial screeners, even if they are not involved in the project 
anymore. Moreover, if the screeners' tendency to reject what seems too different is a 
concern, companies may want to think about ways to increase the diversity and size of 
the pool of gatekeepers, for example through idea contests, or by setting aside resources 
that proposers of ideas can use to mature them further without the need for approval, such 
as Google's and 3M’s policy to allow for time for personal projects.  
Finally, the results suggest that it would be a mistake to develop decision aids 
along the lines of only decision analytical theories, such as Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) [50] and scoring models [27]. In the FFE, with its high of uncertainty, people will 
not be able to perform the operations needed to make comparative judgments and will 
always rely on heuristic. Only some of these heuristics are compensatory and none of 
them weigh criteria. Furthermore decision makers treat criteria as interdependent and 
cannot evaluate alternatives criterion-by-criterion, but frequently link criteria them 
evaluate them together. These insights may provide some strategies for improving 
decision aids, such as checklists and scoring models: overall, they may be more useful if 
they employed a less-is-more approach, focus on only few criteria, and do not dominantly 
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APPENDIX A- TAXONOMY OF RESEARCH ON HEURISTICS DECISION 
Classification Research Topic Reference 
Theoretical reviews, and 
in comparison with 
other decision models 
 
Literature and theoretical review 
of human judgment and fast and 
frugal heuristics to show that 
human judgment is adaptive to 
time and cost constraints 
[91, 100, 103, 138, 




Usage of simple 
heuristics 
Investigates the question if 
people make decisions in a fast 
and frugal manner? How often 
they use them? And how useful 
these heuristics? 
[103, 119, 158, 161, 
260, 265, 266] 
Evidence of usefulness 
of using less information  
  
Testing the confidence and 
accuracy of decision made with 
more information in comparison 
to those with less information. 
Key finding: less information can 
give same or better quality 
predictions 
[95, 97, 110, 123, 
258, 266-268]  
 
Fast and frugal 
heuristics in use – 
medical field 
 
Quality of fast and frugal decision 
tree in assisting physicians in 
diagnosing and assessing 
physician making quick decisions. 
Key findings: FF heuristics are 
more accurate than physicians’ 
decisions and regression models. 
They have higher sensitivity and 
[63, 104, 107, 164, 





smaller false rates. 
Fast and frugal 
heuristics in use – 
Forecasting 
Comparing FF heuristics with 
different forecasting methods 
like regression model, artificial 
neural network, neighbor 
analysis, and intelligence 
analysis, for forecasting 
performance in sport, business 
and alarm, and others. 
Key findings: FF model give 
similar or close accuracy results 
in a shorter time  
 
[63-66, 84, 85, 101, 
106, 107, 112, 113, 
132, 162, 193, 258, 
270-272] 
Researching different 
fast and frugal heuristics 
Priority heuristics: algorithm, 
application and quality. 
[94, 164] 
Categorization by Elimination and 
Elimination by Aspect heuristics  
[63, 93, 108, 123, 
165-167, 251, 271, 
273-276] 
Take the best: algorithm, 
application and quality 
[89, 92, 93, 98, 99, 
107, 114, 132, 155] 
Tallying Heuristics [89, 102, 132, 168] 
Conjunctive Heuristics  [113, 250, 277] 
Recognition Heuristics [103, 114, 155, 278] 
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Choice of loan 
candidates 
People use more 
information  


























Information extracted from 
CDM used to form a guide 
to early sepsis assessment 
in the NICU, which contains 
information not available in 
the current literature 






Elimination by aspect has 
been used: 
Buyers first eliminated 
vendors on basis of price 
differences and delivery 
time and then looked at 






Number of alternatives had 








Found evidence for linear 
and nonlinear strategies 
being used in rating task. 
Regression and process 
tracing had similar 
predictive ability and 
should complement each 
other. 






CTA as an 
analytical tool 













Five broad categories of 
cognitive activities were 
identified: pattern 
recognition; uncertainty 
management; strategic vs. 
tactical thinking; team 
coordination and 
maintenance of common 
ground; and creation and 















candidates statements did not differ 
across 
conditions but number of 
evaluative statements were 
related to type of display; 
display and verbal 
statement 


















in the Gulf 
Coast 
Develop concept map for 
weather forecasting that 
lays out expert knowledge 
about 
the role of cold fronts in the 


















CDM develop a 
foundation of 
Knowledge 
Identify parts of the job 
that require skilled 











10 years of 
experience 
 Choice of car Mood state affected 
response.  
EBA been used 
No subject used a linear 
strategy. 





Number of alternatives 
affected the evaluation. 
Non-compensatory 
strategies that 
concentration on fewer 
attributes.  
 
9 students [284] 
CDM The objective 
of this study 
was to 
examine the 
way in which 
decisions are 







decision (RPD) model was 
synthesized from these 
data, which emphasized the 
use of recognition rather 
than calculation or analysis 
for 

























n of technical 
innovations. 














that pose risks 
for medical 
errors. 
A high number of cognitive 
shifts and interruptions that 
disrupting nurse's attention 







Interview Choice of 
groceries 
Number of alternatives 
















E-Record improve the 
quality of documentation 
even though it has more 
steps 





Value of cues affected use 




















Interns who studied 
cognitive process 
information have better 
performance than those 













APPENDIX C- INTERVIEW GUIDELINE TEMPLATE 
Name of the interviewee ………………………………………. 
Name of the company ……………………………………….…..  
Functional Role …………………………………………………..…. 
Years on Job ……………………………………………………….…. 
Years with Company …………………………………………….… 
Introduction: 
At the first evaluation of new product concept, what is been called front–end, 
product opportunities are screened to identify those ideas that are promising and should 
be developed further into product concepts. This research aim to study the procedures and 
criteria used to evaluate project concept at this stage.  
General about the new product proposal screening (5 -7 minutes) 
1. How does the FFE screening happened in your company?  
2. Do you use any decision making tools (software) to evaluate the projects or to 
make selecting decision? Or compare them with historical data or previous 
projects. 
3. How many proposals do you usually evaluate at once? 
 
Details about screening process (15-20 min) 
1. When you get new proposals, when you get a proposal for new product, what kind 
of information they provide to you?  
2. How accurate is this information? 
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3. How do you start? Or what do you look for when you study the new product 
proposal? 
Probe Question if the answer was not provided before this point 
a. What are the most important criteria you search for?  
4. If you go back to the last project you recommended going with, what were its 
characteristics? 
5. Why did you think it was a good project?  
6. What were your specific goals at this time? 
7. How did you evaluate that project? 
Probe questions: asked about that certain experience and examples to understand 
about the process been used. 
a. Did you put more weight on these (……) criteria over others? 
b. If the project satisfies some criteria and not others (or you don’t have 
enough information about all criteria) how did you evaluate that project? 
c. So even though the project was likely not to satisfy this …. Criterion, you 
recommended it. 
d. So, you compare these proposals against each other... evaluate them 
independently 
 
8. Were your decision based on previous experience with the customer, product, 
company, etc.  
Probe questions:  
a. Which one 
b. How much do you count on this previous experience?  
c. ex. if a new customer come up with project that may bring more profit 
than an old customer and you have limited time and resources which one 
would you choose  
 
9. When you give your recommendation to go with this specific project, how did 
you defend your choice? 
10. Were you satisfied with your decision? 
11. What are key factors if would be known (or situation would be different ) would 
make you make different decision 
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12. What was the final evaluation of the project ($, Performance, succeed (How), 
Cancelled (Why), failed (Why)) 
Optional probe if we did not get enough answers 
a. Remembering the last project you recommend to reject, why did reject that 
project? 
13. From your experience, did you ever have the feeling that the project was likely to 
fail and it actually happened (or the opposite)? What brought that feeling? What 
did you see in that project that other people did not see? 
Closing (summary) Questions (5-7 minutes): 
After making sure that we understand the process used for project screening, 
the next optional questions are coming to overall picture of the evaluation. 
14. From your experience, what is usually going wrong with the initial project 
evaluation?  
15. How often the company kills projects (or continues on the back burner)? Why 





PROCEDURE AND ISSUES FOR INTERVIEWS: 
1. The goal from the interview template questions is to guide and encourage the 
interviewee to discuss his experience and skills at recognizing the situation, 
evaluating the most important criteria, provide us with actual dynamic process of 
project evaluation. 
2. Time needed to finish the interview: In cases of limited time available for 
interviewing experts, questions should be prioritized to focus on understanding 
strategies bases for decisions in evaluation proposals. This can happen by 
encourage interviewee to talk about previous experiences and reflect on them.  
3. Interview will take the dialog form, which means that questions may not be asked 
in the same order, using the same words. 
4. If the interviewee cannot come up with case immediately, several cases might be 
briefly discussed that participant would pick up one case and go from there. 
5. Ask the interviewee to draw sketches or graphs to present the steps, or to provide 








EMAIL LETTER SENT PRIOR THE INTERVIEW 
Dear…….. 
Thank you for your interest in my dissertation research on the ….. 
Your contribution will defiantly add value to the study, which I value and 
appreciate. 
Through this interview I am seeking comprehensive description of your 
experience in screening project concept at the very early stages. I hope you will be as 
accurate and comprehensive on how do you make these decisions, including all your 
thoughts, feelings, behaviors, as well as situations and evidence that you experienced. 
You may recall some evidence; share your personal notes, journals or other ways in 
which you used and recorded your experience. You may use flowcharts, drawing or 
writing to provide further explanation. 
This interview will be recorded, and all information will be in complete 
confidentiality and used just for research purpose. 
I really appreciate your commitment of time and efforts. 
Sincerely,  




APPENDIX D- INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Dear Mr. / Ms. 
You are invited to participate in a research in a research study conducted by 
Fatima M. Albar from Portland State University, College of Engineering and Computer 
Science toward her PhD degree in Engineering and Technology Management, under the 
supervision of Dr. Antonie Jetter, where the researcher seeks to study the process of 
evaluating new product/project at the fuzzy front end. 
Because of your experience in evaluation projects at the very early stages, we are 
looking to conduct an interview with you lasting 60-90 minutes. Through this interview, 
we seek a comprehensive description of your experience in screening project concepts at 
the very early stages of product development. We hope you will be as accurate and 
comprehensive on how you make these decisions, including all your thoughts, feelings, 
behaviors, as well as situations and evidence that you experienced. You may recall some 
evidence, share your personal notes, journals or other ways in which you used and 
recorded your experience. You may use flowcharts and/or drawing or writing to provide 
further explanation. However, you will not be asked to reveal any information about a 
specific project or to name any projects, individuals, or companies. 
This interview will be audio recorded for the purpose of this research. Any 
information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be linked to you or 
identify you will be kept confidential; the names of the participants, projects and the 
companies will be coded and all data will be deleted after we are done with the research 
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analysis. Your contribution will definitely add value to the study, which I value and 
appreciate. This study is important to because it will help increase system science 
knowledge about new product evaluation, and it will result in proposing a new decision 
model to be used to train non-expert managers. Although your participation is 
appreciated, you need to know that your participation is voluntary, and if you do not want 
to take part in this study, it will not affect your relationship with Portland State 
University. 
If you have concerns or problems about your participation in this study or your 
rights as a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review 
Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 600 Unitus Building., Portland 
State University, (503) 725-4288 / 1-877-480-4400. If you have questions about the study 
itself, contact Fatima Albar at albarfm@pdx.edu. 
Your signature indicates that you have read and understand the above information 
and agree to take part in this study. Please understand that you may withdraw your 
consent at any time without penalty, and that, by signing, you are not waiving any legal 
claims, rights or remedies. A copy of this form will be provided to you for your own 
records. 
Sincerely,  
 Fatima M. Albar  
______________________________________ __________________________ 
Signature          Date 
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APPENDIX E- CODEBOOK 
Class Coding 
Node 

























I struggled for a while 
because this 
investment is not 





















Your portfolio should 
contain a bunch of 
high risk high payoff, 
medium risk maybe 
medium to low 
payoff, and then sure 
things you got to do 













































It was so successful, 
that most people are 
pissed off if they go 
anywhere in the 
civilized world and 
open up their laptop 
and there’s not 
connectivity. I mean, 





New Idea Is it a new 
idea? New 
innovation  




We knew technically 
how They work in 
general idea. But it 























I mean the first thing 
that comes to mind is 
who is talking to me; 



























look bad,  dimension to it 
where you don’t 
want to be a fool 
relative to other 







Will it affect 






I don’t want to lose 
my reputation with 
my brand that the 







































to do it, 
Have the technology 
or at least have the 


































The main goal out of 
this product was to 
use the same 
technology in 
another high end … 
15  












I took the risk 





Is it a new 
market? Is 










But it was completely 























How big is 
the market 









How big is the 
market size of these 
products? How big is 
the market share I 












It is huge market that 











He showed me some 
estimation for a good 














What are other 
products in the 
market that are close 
to this product? 
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The first question is: 






Do we have 










If you come up with a 
cost, then what 
resources are going 
to be needed, you 
know, to actually 
design and, you know 















How many leaps of 
faith it requires, the 








So another category 













Economy will look 












some time trying to 












of a choice 
over 
another 
 Here, let’s do it this 
way, this idea, you 
know, here’s what I 
think the market 
potential is, here’s 
what I think the 
revenue potential is, 
here’s what I think 
the margin potential 
is,  
Interviewer: All those 
are just estimations… 
Interviewee #1: 
Here’s why I think we 
should do it, it 

















blah blah blah blah 
blah. The next thing 
you have to do is 
forecast an 
investment stream. 
And along with the 
investment stream 
you have to forecast 












 This is the first step 
and actually the one 
that I think 
sometimes people 
will take too long to 
get through, you 
have to first be clear 
in your own mind 
that you need to 
make a change and 
very often that 
question in itself, I 
think that’s the first 
step in the decision 
process is becoming 













own mind that you 









 Ok, a product has 
been proposed to 
make a new piece of 
technology (I don’t to 
go through the 
details) ... the 
product concept was 
good, it sounds solid 
and it is achievable, 
we can make it. the 
proposer thought 
that we have the 
ability to market it 
through the same 
channels we market 
our current products, 
we just need to 
advertise for it as we 
advertise for any new 
products, and he 
show me some 















sounded good, but I 
struggled for a while 
because this 
investment is not 
within our core 
business, we are not 
familiar with this 
market. On paper it 
seemed good but I 
could not feel it, I 
didn't think it is the 
right thing to do. 












the idea by 
the decision 
 I think people make 
that mistake too 
because going with 
the thing you know is 
the easiest and I have 























 So, even though it 
was a good idea it 
doesn’t fit with what 











 Things that are 
possible there are 
things that may be 
could happen, and 
then there is things 
that you kind of 








and cons to 
a level of 
satisfaction 
to make a 
decision  
 We don’t have a 
formal process for 
that, we don’t have, 
my vote is worth so 
much, it’s a 
collaborative 
process, but 
ultimately at the end 
of the day I think if 













consensus it’s likely 
we’re going to 
probably say no. We 
have to really be able 
to reach alignment 
on whether this 
makes sense or not, 
and if we can’t then 






and cons of 
the project  
  I am not into this 
market, I don’t know 




















Some people will 
have some feeling 
more for some ideas 









, I saw 
before, I 
learnt this 
From my pervious 
experiences......I did 
not trust this idea 
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know everything, but 
by the time you get 
all the data, the 
data’s nine months 
old so you don’t 




































Business Scope 1 2    1  5 1 1 1 2 8 14 
Company 
Portfolio 
3  1 4  1  1     5 10 
Competitors 3 3 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 3 5 4 12 31 
Creating a New 
Norm  
2 1  1  1    2   5 7 




3  2 1 3 4    4 5 16 8 38 
Preserving 
Ones Credibility 
1   1      3   3 5 
Brand 
Reputation 
     1  2     2 3 
Customer 
Needs  
4 3 5  6 9  4 3 1 1 7 10 43 
Future State of 
The Economy  
2        1    2 3 




1    1 1 5      4 8 





6 1  4 2 7 1 2 4   3 9 30 
New Market 1       3     2 4 
Product 
Concept 
3 3 3   7 4 5  7 6 14 9 52 
Postponed 
Project  
           2 2 3 
Profitability 8 1 2 4   2 2 3   1 8 23 
Resources 1 5 4   1 1     1 6 13 
Risk 7 1 6 1  1   1 1  1 8 19 
Size of 
Investment  





5 4 1 2 7 3 4 6 5 11 12 63 
Technology 
Significance 






















































Recognition  1 3    3 3 2  1 1 2 8 16 
EBA    2 1 1 2  2 1 4 3 8 16 
Categorizatio
n 
 1         1 5 3 7 
Conjunctive    1 1 1   2 2  3 6 10 




2 3 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 4 4 5  
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APPENDIX H- INTERCODER RELIABILITY 
Intercoder reliability is a standard measure of research quality and is considered s a 
critical component of content analysis [288, 289], even though there are few standards 
and guidelines available concerning how to properly calculate and report intercoder 
reliability [290].  
Popular methods for establishing intercoder reliability involve presenting 
predetermined text segments to different coders [291]. Intercoder reliability is achieved 
when independent coders evaluate the characteristics of a message and reach consistent 
conclusions when applying the same codebook [290, 291]. In practice, there is always 
coding disagreements in the coding sample [290]. Neuendorf [292] sets a rule of thumb 
that declares intercoder reliability at above 80% as being good and from 67-79% as being 
acceptable. According to Lombard et al. [290]. 90% or greater are always acceptable, 
80% or greater is acceptable in most situations, and 70% may be appropriate in some 
exploratory studies for some indices but it is hard to interpret and call into question the 
value of replication [293]. The research in this dissertation is inductive and of exploratory 
nature; the target limit for intercoder reliability is therefore set at 80% or above. 
Intercoder reliability is calculated by examining the degree to which coders agree 
across a fixed set of units [291]. For the purpose of this research percentage agreement 
has been used as a measurement for intercoder reliability. Percentage of agreement, also 
known as raw percent agreement or crude agreement, is defined as “the percentage of all 
coding decisions made by pairs of coders on which the coders agree.” [290] page 590. 
Percentage agreement does not account for agreement that occurs simply by chance, and 
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can be artificially kept high if a large number of codes that are rarely used or rarely 
disagreed upon are included in the codebook [290]. On the other hand, it counts any 
coding that does not use an identical, but a conceptually similar code as disagreement, 
thus potentially over reporting the disagreements [290]. An advantage of the method is its 
conceptual and computational simplicity and the fact that it can accommodate any 
number of coders [290]. Moreover, some of its limitations can be addressed through a 
reliable codebook that contains sufficiently granular and reliable codes. To establish high 
level of reliability for the codebook, the codebook in this research was pretested and 
revised by three experts to ensure the clarity of the definitions and the examples as 
recommended by literature [240, 294].  
To insure the quality of this research two processes of intercoder reliability have 
been applied: coding two whole interviews, and coding different samples from coded 
segments. Three different coder than the researcher participated in this process  
In the first process two complete interviews were coded by the researcher (Coder 1) 
and a second coder (Coder 2), who was experienced with the topic and the code book. 
Although this approach is harder and more time consuming than giving sample segments 
to other coders, it avoids lifting text from its original context, or making interpretations 
about the length of codable text [291]. The results were compared for the intercoder 
reliability using NVivo 9 - the qualitative analysis software- by running Coding 
Comparison Query. The percentage agreement used by Nvivo is defined as the 
percentage of the source’s content where the two users agree on whether the content may 
be coded at the node. Running the comparison query for the two interviews coded by the 
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Coder 1 and Coder 2, shows that Coder 1 agreed with Coder 2 on 85% of the codes, thus 
achieving the desired target value.  
For independent sample coding, two different groups of samples segments were 
prepared. One sample contained examples of decision criteria, which were expected to be 
easier to code correctly than decision heuristics. The other sample contained text 
sequences pertaining to different decision heuristics. Splitting the samples ensure that 
results are not accumulated around decision criteria alone or biased toward any particular 
type of text. Codes were considered similar only if both coders used identical set of 
codes. The percentage of agreement was calculated by dividing the number of agreement 
codes by the total number of codes. The researchers (Coder 1) agreed with Coder 3 on 
88% and with Coder 4 on 84% of the codes.  
Intercoder reliability of this research is therefore acceptable. 
 
 
